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Does Quality of Governance Increase Trust in Politics and Institutions? Structural Modelling Applied to the 2021 OECD Survey "Trust to Reinforce Democracy"

Auteurs :
Serge Allegrezza[1], Wolfgang Langer[2], Majlinda Joxhe[3]

Résumé / Abstract

FR
Cet article teste le cadre conceptuel de l'OCDE sur la confiance dans les institutions. Nous utilisons l'enquête sur la confiance dans les institutions menée par l'OCDE dans 18 pays en 2021. À l'aide d'un modèle d'équation structurelle, nous estimons un modèle factoriel confirmatoire pour trois dimensions sous-jacentes : la confiance dans la politique, la confiance dans les institutions et la qualité de la gouvernance. Les scores de ces facteurs sont ensuite utilisés dans une analyse de régression afin d'explorer systématiquement les déterminants socio-économiques tels que l'âge, le sexe et le niveau d'éducation, et de comparer les résultats à ceux du rapport de l'OCDE de 2022. Notre étude corrobore presque tous les effets sociodémographiques sur la confiance décrits dans le rapport. En outre, notre étude met en évidence le rôle important de la qualité de la gouvernance en tant que prédicteur robuste des niveaux de confiance globaux. Enfin, pour vérifier la robustesse des régressions par les MCO, nous utilisons également une approche de régression distributionnelle à l'aide de régressions non paramétriques (fonctions d'influence recentrées). Nos résultats révèlent des schémas clairs : aux quantiles inférieurs de confiance, le sexe, le niveau d'éducation et le revenu présentent des relations positives et significatives. À l'inverse, aux quantiles supérieurs, et en particulier au quantile 0,90, leur impact passe à une association négative. Ces résultats soulignent l'importance de vérifier les associations non linéaires, qui peuvent produire des résultats sensiblement différents par rapport aux cadres traditionnels des MCO.

EN
This paper tests the OECD conceptual framework of trust in institutions. We use the survey on trust in institutions administered by the OECD in 18 countries in 2021. Employing a structural equation model, we estimate a confirmatory factor model for three underlying dimensions: trust in politics, trust in institutions, and quality of governance. These factors' scores are then used in a regression analysis in order to systematically explore socioeconomic determinants such as age, gender, and education level, and compare the findings to those of the 2022 OECD report. Our study corroborates almost all the sociodemographic effects on trust described in the report. Furthermore, our study highlights the important role of quality of governance as a robust predictor of overall trust levels. Finally, to check the robustness of the OLS regressions, we also employ a distributional regression approach using non-parametric regressions (re-centered influence functions). Our findings reveal clear patterns: at lower quantiles of trust, gender, education level, and income exhibit positive and significant relationships. Conversely, at higher quantiles, and particularly the 0.90 quantile, their impact shifts to a negative association. These results underscore the importance of checking non-linear associations, which may yield markedly different outcomes compared to traditional OLS frameworks.

Keywords: Trust, Public Institutions, OECD, SEM, Government

[1]STATEC, Honorary Director of the National Statistical Institute of Luxembourg, President of STATEC Research, mail: serge.allegrezza@ext.statec.etat.lu
[2]Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Institut für Soziologie, Associate Professor, mail: wolfgang.langer@soziologie.uni-halle.de
[3]STATEC, Researcher for the National Statistical Institute of Luxembourg, mail: majlinda.joxhe@ext.statec.etat.lu

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Structural Modelling Applied to the 2021 OECD Survey "Trust to Reinforce Democracy"

Serge Allegrezza[1]

Wolfgang Langer[2]

Majlinda Joxhe[3]

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Abstract

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[2] Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg, Institut für Soziologie, Associate Professor, e-mail: wolfgang.langer@soziologie.uni-halle.de

[3] STATEC, Researcher for the National Statistical Institute of Luxembourg, e-mail: majlinda.joxhe@ext.statec.etat.lu

1. Introduction

Public trust in government is crucial for effective governance and to tackle contemporary challenges such as health crises, economic disparities, and climate change. Trust reduces transaction costs and encourages compliance with policies, fostering investment and public reforms. While democratic systems allow for criticism, trust remains a vital measure of institutional quality and citizen-government relations.

In a broad sense, institutional trust encompasses citizens' assessments of governmental bodies and of individual political leaders regarding their reliability, professionalism, fairness, and integrity (Blind, 2007). It is important to acknowledge that trust can also flow in the opposite direction, in terms of how much government institutions trust the people and whether this dynamic influences the governing practices of a state (Yang, 2005). Low levels of trust in institutions can have serious consequences for social and political stability, as well as for economic growth and development. Trust is essential for cooperation and collective action, and without it societies can become fragmented and dysfunctional. Efforts to rebuild trust in institutions have focused on a range of strategies, including greater transparency and accountability, increased public participation, and more effective communication.

Trust encompasses various facets such as integrity, responsiveness, reliability, openness, fairness, and satisfaction with public services, each representing distinct dimensions that contribute to overall trustworthiness. Our paper establishes a new approach to clarify how these multiple factors influence trust. Drawing on the drivers of the trust framework developed by the OECD,[4] our approach is theory-driven (unlike traditional exploratory methods), allowing us to construct a predetermined measurement model that aligns observed indicators with theoretical dimensions or latent variables. We use confirmatory factor analysis to test the conceptual framework developed by the OECD (Brezzi et al., 2021) for the measurement of trust in public institutions and the drivers of trust.

This framework was instrumental in setting up the OECD questionnaire used to collect data on trust. The questionnaire provides data allowing us to test the perceived integrity, responsiveness, reliability, openness and fairness of public services, as well as people's satisfaction with these. We use a second-order factor model to construct an overall latent factor termed "quality of governance" and estimate the model using data from 18 OECD states, comprising 22,554 observations. We construct three overall factors referred to as trust in institutions, trust in politics, and a third subsuming indicators pertaining to quality of governance. These factors are then used in a regression analysis to explore the effects of individual socioeconomic characteristics. Robustness of the regressions is checked by using non-parametric regressions across different quantiles. Socioeconomic factors such as gender, income, and

[4] See Section 2 for a more in-depth explanation.

social status emerge as significant influences, alongside the essential role of political engagement. Notably, our exploration also sheds light on the varied impacts of country-specific factors on trust levels and shows different results on the distributional side. By unravelling these complexities, our study aims to inform policymakers and researchers, fostering a deeper comprehension of trust dynamics and facilitating targeted interventions to reinforce institutional trust.

2. The underlying dimensions of trust in the OECD data

The academic literature on trust in public institutions identifies three main trends. Firstly, cultural factors shape individual trust or distrust, influenced by early socialization and interpersonal networks (Tabellini, 2008). Secondly, economic cycles and personal characteristics play a role in determining trust levels (Algan et al., 2018, 2019). Thirdly, institutional performance and reputation are crucial, with regard to both processes and outcomes (Bouckaert, 2012; Rothstein, 2013; Van de Walle, 2020).

While trust in institutions is influenced by cultural, economic, and institutional factors, the OECD dataset emphasizes the importance of high-performing institutions in building public trust. There is a causality issue going from government perception to the proper working of institutions (Van de Walle and Bouckaert, 2003). Some scholars distinguish between "trust in competence" (ability to meet expectations) and "trust in intentions" (acting in good faith) (Nooteboom, 2006). Additionally, trust may stem from either outcomes ("logic of consequences") or values such as integrity and transparency ("logic of appropriateness") (Bouckaert, 2012; Choi and Kim, 2012). We can also distinguish between sceptic trust, based on objective data of the functioning of institutions and rational analysis of performance and trust (Norris, 2023).

The OECD Drivers of Trust Survey has undergone extensive revision and expansion, incorporating insights from the OECD's Guidelines on Measuring Trust (OECD, 2017). A thorough review of the survey questionnaire by an advisory group consisting of representatives from OECD countries and national statistical offices has strengthened its international comparability. Additionally, in November 2021 the survey was for the first time conducted simultaneously in 22 OECD countries.

The updated 2021 survey introduces several innovations in the measurement of trust in public institutions (see Figure 1). Firstly, it distinguishes between types of institutions and levels of government, recognizing variation in drivers of trust that may signal performance-related risks. Secondly, it evaluates government performance and governance quality principles such as integrity, openness, and fairness from the perspective of citizens, complementing existing governance indicators. Thirdly, it explores citizens' perceptions of government actions regarding long-term and global challenges, as well as their participation in public debates and policymaking. Finally, it moves beyond static indicators of perception or satisfaction to capture the "trustworthiness" of institutions through situational questions about people's expectations and experiences with public services, akin to consumer confidence indices.

The framework for understanding drivers of public trust in government also underwent significant revisions, particularly emphasizing several key points. It now emphasizes the importance of ensuring representation of diverse population groups, taking into account factors such as living in different areas and socioeconomic background (González and Smith, 2017). Additionally, it includes various public institutions, recognizing significant variation in trust between them (González and Smith, 2017). The framework also reiterates the influence of satisfaction with services and civil service capabilities on public trust. Furthermore, it highlights the importance of equal opportunities for political participation and representation (González and Smith, 2017). Moreover, it integrates cultural, political, and economic factors that influence trust, with particular attention to individual and group dynamics (Brezzi et al., 2020). These revisions underscore the role of political attitudes, including disengagement, in explaining institutional trust, as well as the importance of confidence in policy effectiveness in addressing long-term challenges (Brezzi et al., 2020)

The OECD Drivers of Trust Survey covers a wide range of countries, with around 2000 respondents per country across twenty-two nations: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Ireland, Iceland, Japan, Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

Figure 1: OECD Drivers of Trust

Levels of trust in different public institutions		
Trust in national government, **local government**, civil service, parliament, police, **political parties**, courts, legal systems and **intergovernmental organisations**		
Public Governance Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions		
Competencies	Responsiveness	• Provide efficient, quality, affordable, timely and citizen-centred public services **that are co-ordinated across levels of government and satisfy users.** • **Develop an innovative and efficient civil service that responds to user needs**.
	Reliability	• Anticipate needs and assess evolving challenges. • Minimise uncertainty in the economic, social and political environment. • **Effectively commit to future-oriented policies and co-operate with stakeholders on global challenges**.
Values	*Openness*	• Provide open and accessible information so the public better understands what government is doing. • Consult, listen, and respond to stakeholders, including through citizen participation and engagement opportunities that lead to tangible results. • **Ensure there are equal opportunities to be part of and participate in the institutions of representative democracy.**
	Integrity	• Align public institutions with ethical values, principles, and norms to safeguard the public interest. • Take decisions and use public resources ethically, promoting the public interest over private interests while combating corruption. • Ensure accountability mechanisms between public institutions at all levels of governance. • **Promote a neutral civil service whose values and standards of conduct uphold and prioritise the public interest.**
	Fairness	• Improve living conditions for all. • Provide consistent treatment of businesses and people regardless of their background and identify (e.g. gender, socio-economic status, racial/ethnic origin).
Cultural, Economic and Political Drivers of Trust in Public Institutions		
• Individual and group identities, traits, and preferences, including socio-economic status; interpersonal socialisation and networks. • Distrust of and disengagement from the system.		
Perception of government action on intergenerational and global challenges		
• Perceptions of government commitment to and effectiveness in addressing long-term challenges.		

Source: Brezzi et al. (2021)

At the national level, the survey was conducted using various means, including online YouGov platforms, national statistical offices (in Finland, Ireland, Mexico, and the UK), national research institutes (Iceland), and survey research firms (New Zealand and Norway).[5] YouGov's online surveys

[5] Additional details are available in the 2022 OECD report "Building Trust to Reinforce Democracy".

employed a non-probability sampling method with quotas to guarantee national representation across age, gender, region, and education. Most YouGov surveys occurred in November and December 2021, while others were conducted within a year before or after that timeframe.

3. Introducing synthetic indicators for the measurement of trust

3.1 Reducing data dimensionality through a confirmatory factor model

Based on the drivers of trust framework developed by the OECD in 2021 (OECD report 2021), we adopt a confirmatory modelling approach.[6] This statistical model, originally formulated by Karl G. Jöreskog (1970), combines the benefits of confirmatory factor analysis and path modelling; unlike classical exploratory factor analysis, it is theory-driven rather than data-driven. In this confirmatory approach, a predetermined measurement model is essential, indicating how each observed indicator corresponds to a theoretical dimension, latent variable, or factor, with all other cross-loadings constrained to zero.

In line with the updated framework on drivers of trust in public institutions as outlined in Brezzi et al.'s 2021 publication, we have specified our confirmatory factor model with dependent factors as follows:[7]

1. For the **"Quality of Governance"** factor:

- Items **q3** (job in exchange for political favor), **q4** (court free from political influence), and **q5** (give money to access public service) assess the integrity factor.
- Items **q6** (complaining about the public service), **q7** (innovative idea for public service), and **q8** (50% of people against a national policy) gauge the responsiveness factor.
- Items **q9** (government protects against spread of disease), **q10** (public agency using data for legitimate purposes), and **q11** (stable business regulation from government) evaluate the reliability factor.
- Items **q12** (voice your views of local government), **q13** (available info on administrative procedures), and **q14** (government adopts public opinions for policy) measure openness.
- Items **q15** (public employees treat rich and poor equally), **q16** (public employees treat all people equally), and **q17** (people are treated fairly for government benefits) pertain to the fairness factor.

[6] For linear structural relationships, see Jöreskog et al. (2016).
[7] Please refer to Appendix A for the questions as seen in the OECD documentation (Brezzi et al., 2021).

- Additionally, we measure satisfaction with public services through items **q18** (satisfaction with education system), **q19** (satisfaction with health system), and **q20** (satisfaction with administrative system).

2. For the **"Trust in Politics"** factor:

- Trust in politics is exclusively measured by items **q2_1** (trust in national government), **q2_2** (trust in local government), **q2_3** (trust in parliament), and **q2_4** (trust in political parties).

3. For the **"Trust in Institutions"** factor:

- Trust in institutions is measured by items **q2_5** (trust in police), **q2_6** (trust in civil servants), and **q2_8** (trust courts and legal system).

All items are rated on an eleven-point Likert scale from zero to ten, which we consider to have a metric measurement level.

In most countries surveyed in 2021, OECD Trust Survey or other providers (National Surveys), a non-probabilistic quota sampling procedure is utilized. Post-stratification weights are applied to account for lower response rates among certain groups and to ensure representativeness of the national population. Consequently, all structural equation models are estimated with these weights. We also assess the multivariate normality assumption of the observed indicators for both the overall sample and each national subsample. In both cases, the observed indicators do not follow a multivariate normal distribution. Therefore, we apply the Satorra-Bentler correction to standard errors of estimates and likelihood-ratio chi² values for the actual and null structural equation models. To assess model fit, we employ fit indices. We estimate this model using data from the overall sample of eighteen OECD states, comprising 22,554 cases with list-wise deletion of missing values[8].

[8] We have excluded 4 countries due to the unviability of the data:



Figure 2: First- and second-order path modelling of trust

In Figure 2, the ellipses represent the first-order factors as latent variables, which are measured by their corresponding indicators. The squares symbolize these observed variables. An arrow extending from the factor to the indicator signifies the factor loading, representing the estimated covariance between the factor and the indicator. In the standardized solution, this loading falls between minus one and plus one, indicating the corresponding correlation.

The circular shape behind the square represents the independent measurement error of the indicator. In the standardized solution, it denotes the proportion of variance that cannot be attributed to the common factor, often referred to as the unique factor. In measurement theory based on factor analysis, each indicator should share at least fifty percent of its variance with the common factor. This implies that the standardized factor loading should be around 0.70. In Figure 2, all loadings of the factors "Trust in Politics" and "Trust in Institutions" exceed this criterion. Overall, the first-order factors, including

"Satisfaction", "Integrity", "Responsiveness", "Reliability", "Openness", and "Fairness", are well-measured by their respective indicators or items.

Given strong correlations between the drivers of trust (ranging from r = +0.52 to r = +0.85), we introduce a second-order factor named "Quality of Governance" to explain these correlations, following the approach of Rindskopf and Rose (1988), Jöreskog et al. (2016), and Jöreskog and Sörbom (2019).

In Figure 2, the arrows extending from the "Quality of Governance" factor to the first-order factors represent the factor loadings. These loadings indicate the relative weight of the corresponding sub-dimension for the "general factor". In the standardized solution, they also fall between minus one and plus one. In Figure 2, "Reliability" is the most significant sub-dimension, with a loading of 0.95, followed by "Openness" (0.92), "Responsiveness" (0.84), "Fairness" (0.83), "Integrity" (0.80), and "Satisfaction" (0.77).

The circular symbol above a first-order factor represents its prediction error, estimating the proportion of variance in the first-order factor that cannot be explained by the second-order factor. The double-headed arrows between the ellipses representing "Trust in Politics", "Trust in Institutions", and "Quality of Governance" represent the freely estimated correlations between these factors. "Quality of Governance" has an estimated correlation of r = +0.78 with "Trust in Politics" and "Trust in Institutions", indicating that higher quality governance is associated with greater trust in politics and institutions. The estimated correlation between "Trust in Politics" and "Trust in Institutions" is +0.76, signifying a mutual relationship between them.

3.2 Assessing the goodness of fit of the confirmatory factor model

The results from the second-order factor model analysis across multiple countries reveal a generally strong fit of the model to the data, as shown in Table 1. Across all 18 countries included in the analysis, the likelihood-ratio chi-squared test yields a highly significant result (p = 0.000), indicating that the observed data significantly deviate from what would be expected under the model.[9] However, other fit indices suggest excellent model fit, with root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA) values ranging from 0.036 to 0.060, which fall within the range typically considered indicative of good fit. Additionally, the comparative fit index (CFI) and Tucker-Lewis index (TLI) consistently exceed the

[9] This goodness-of-fit test heavily depends on the sample size because the output of the test is equal to the minimum of the fit function multiplied by the sample size. For a sample size of over 200, nearly every model is falsified (Satorra and Saris, 1985). Many authors have developed goodness-of-fit indices constrained to the range between zero and one. Mulaik et al. (1989), Marsh et al. (1996), and Hu and Bentler (1999) have tested the most popular fit indices in Monte Carlo simulation studies. They recommend the Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), also known as Bentler and Bonet's non-normed-fit index (NNFI), Bentler's confirmative fit index (CFI), and Steiger's root mean squared error of approximation (RMSEA), to assess model fit. Schumacker and Lomax (2010, p. 76) formulate the following generally accepted cut-off criteria: A TLI/NNFI value close to 0.90 or 0.95 reflects a good model fit. A RMSEA value of 0.05 to 0.08 also indicates a close fit. For Bentler's CFI, Aichholzer (2017, p. 128) recommends a cut-off of 0.90 for an acceptable fit and 0.95 for a good fit. According to the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR), he proposes a cut-off value of 0.05 for a good fit and 0.08 for an acceptable fit.

threshold of 0.90, with values ranging from 0.912 to 0.970, further supporting the adequacy of the model across different countries.

Despite the strong overall fit, some variation is observed among specific countries. For instance, while countries like Colombia demonstrate particularly low RMSEA values (0.037) and high CFI and TLI values (0.970 and 0.966, respectively), other countries such as Japan exhibit slightly higher RMSEA (0.056) and lower CFI and TLI values (both 0.912). This variation could be indicative of differences in the underlying structures captured by the second-order factor model across diverse cultural and socioeconomic contexts. Nonetheless, the consistently significant chi-squared test across all countries suggests the presence of some unaccounted-for variability or model misspecification, warranting further investigation to refine the model or explore potential moderators influencing its fit across different national contexts.

Table 1: Quality of the confirmatory factor model

Country	Sample size	L.R.chi²	D.F.	P	RMSEA	CFI	TLI / NNFI	SRMR
All 18	22,554	1590.007	266	0.000	0.015	0.915	0.904	0.043
Australia	1,256	1073.533	266	0.000	0.049	0.950	0.943	0.036
Austria	1,416	1255.192	266	0.000	0.051	0.921	0.911	0.049
Belgium	1,289	1243.931	266	0.000	0.053	0.935	0.927	0.047
Canada	1,258	1119.187	266	0.000	0.050	0.945	0.938	0.043
Colombia	1,652	882.868	266	0.000	0.037	0.970	0.966	0.032
Denmark	1,443	1295.484	266	0.000	0.052	0.932	0.924	0.043
Estonia	815	1041.700	266	0.000	0.060	0.924	0.914	0.045
France	1,171	1206.882	266	0.000	0.055	0.922	0.912	0.048
Iceland	963	636.874	266	0.000	0.038	0.925	0.915	0.050
Ireland	1,005	608.489	266	0.000	0.036	0.935	0.927	0.049
Japan	652	815.346	266	0.000	0.056	0.922	0.912	0.059
Korea	1,595	1343.932	266	0.000	0.050	0.941	0.933	0.037
Latvia	1,229	1431.248	266	0.000	0.060	0.917	0.907	0.055
Luxembourg	848	1016.037	266	0.000	0.058	0.919	0.908	0.047
Netherlands	1,355	1299.179	266	0.000	0.054	0.939	0.931	0.046
Portugal	1,481	1046.562	266	0.000	0.045	0.940	0.932	0.047
Sweden	1,085	1196.944	266	0.000	0.057	0.935	0.926	0.042
United Kingdom	2,041	1412.487	266	0.000	0.0460	0.912	0.900	0.045

The overall second-order factor model reduces the huge number of indicators measuring the "drivers of trust" to one second second-order factor called "Quality of Governance", and the factors "Trust in Politics" and "Trust in Institutions". Using the factor loadings and the indicator means, Stata estimates the score of these latent variables for each respondent using Thompson's regression method. The factor scores have the same range as the chosen reference indicator centered by its mean. Therefore, the expected mean of each factor scale is zero. In Figures 3 to 5, the value zero represents the estimated average of the factor for all 18 countries used in the analysis. We can conclude that our model has a very good fit for all countries and within each country.

3.3 Comparing trust in institutions and politics in all OECD countries



Figure 3: Score for Trust in Politics (confirmatory factor model)

As shown in Figure 3, the analysis of the factor scores for trust in politics across various countries yields interesting insights into cross-cultural differences. In particular, countries exhibit considerable variance in mean trust levels, with Luxemburg and Denmark displaying the highest average median trust and Colombia the lowest. Moreover, nations such as Latvia, Austria, and France have negative median trust scores. Interestingly, all the other countries show a relatively high positive mean trust score, potentially reflecting strong social cohesion and transparent governance structures. These results raise questions about trust levels in highly developed yet socially complex societies and underscore the complexity of trust dynamics across different cultural contexts, hinting at the influence of historical, socioeconomic, and institutional factors in trust formation and maintenance within societies. Further exploration into the underlying drivers of this cross-country variation in trust could offer valuable insights for policymakers and practitioners seeking to foster trust and cooperation within and across nations, for example, with the use of multilevel models including country characteristics.



Figure 4: Score for Trust in Institutions (confirmatory factor model)

Regarding the analysis of trust in institutions across the array of 18 countries, the index reveals interesting cross-national variation. On average, trust levels appear relatively heterogeneous across several nations but with some countries demonstrating a negative mean score and others a positive mean score. For instance, Australia, Austria, Portugal, France, Belgium, Japan, Latvia, and Colombia exhibit negative mean trust scores, with a moderate of variation. Conversely, Denmark and Luxembourg stand out with a notably positive mean trust score that indicates a high level of institutional trust.



Figure 5: Score for Quality of Governance (confirmatory factor model)

Finally, the examination of quality of governance across countries exposes remarkable variation in perceptions of governance effectiveness. Several countries demonstrate positive mean scores, indicating a relatively positive perception of governance quality, albeit with modest magnitudes. Conversely, nations such as Colombia and Japan exhibit negative mean scores suggesting a more skeptical view of governance effectiveness. The top two countries are shown to be Denmark and Korea, showing positive mean scores. Comparing these results with previous analyses of trust reveals intriguing parallels and divergences. While trust and perceptions of governance quality are intertwined concepts, they may not always align perfectly. For instance, Australia and Canada exhibit negative mean trust scores for trust in institutions and politics but show relatively positive mean scores for governance quality. Instead, Denmark has positive mean trust scores across all three factors, and Latvia and Colombia demonstrate notably negative mean trust scores and pessimistic perceptions of governance quality.

4. Exploring the determinants of trust and perceptions of governance quality

4.1 The main socioeconomic determinants

Table 2 presents the regression coefficients between a set of independent variables and three dependent variables derived from the modelling: Trust in Institutions, Trust in Politics, and Quality of Governance. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are employed, with and without country fixed effects to address country heterogeneity and ascertain average effects across all nations. Across all models, several important findings emerge. Firstly, the gender variable (female) exhibits a consistent negative impact on trust in institutions, politics, and governance, aligning with prior (OECD, 2022) analyses.

Additionally, younger age groups (18-29 and 30-49) tend to show lower trust levels across all dimensions compared to older cohorts, echoing findings from OECD (2022) research, particularly in relation to trust in government. Higher levels of education are generally linked with increased trust in institutions, albeit with mixed effects on trust in politics and governance quality. Remarkably, individuals with higher education levels express negative perceptions of governance quality, which differs from the results of the OECD (2022) analyses. Furthermore, lower income levels consistently reduce trust levels, while a higher social status consistently aligns with greater trust levels across all dimensions, consistent with OECD (2022) findings. Political engagement, such as voting for political parties, is positively linked with trust in institutions and politics but negatively impacts perceptions of governance quality, presenting another contrast with OECD reports. Moreover, having a say on political parties consistently increases trust levels across all dimensions, in line with OECD (2022) findings. Trust in others also consistently predicts higher levels of trust across all dimensions, supporting the patterns observed in the OECD (2022) report.

The inclusion of country fixed effects reveals the influence of country-specific factors. For instance, when comparing countries to France as a reference, those with high levels of trust in government also exhibit high levels of trust in institutions and politics and high perceptions of governance quality. Austria, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands, Luxembourg, and the UK consistently show relatively high trust levels across all dimensions, while Colombia and Portugal demonstrate low trust levels. Importantly, the inclusion of country fixed effects does not alter the results with regard to socioeconomic and demographic variables, underscoring the robustness of the findings.

Overall, these results highlight the significance of demographic, socioeconomic, and political factors in shaping trust levels across different countries. Furthermore, accounting for country-specific contexts through the inclusion of fixed effects enhances our understanding of these relationships.

TABLE 2: OLS REGRESSIONS WITHOUT AND WITH COUNTRY FIXED EFFECTS

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
VARIABLES	Trust in Institutions	Trust in Politics	Quality of Governance	Trust in Institutions	Trust in Politics	Quality of Governance
FEMALE	-0.196***	-0.156***	-0.0299**	-0.157***	-0.121***	-0.0197
	(0.0263)	(0.0319)	(0.0149)	(0.0248)	(0.0309)	(0.0147)
AGE 18-29	-0.468***	-0.467***	-0.0641***	-0.296***	-0.316***	-0.0442*
	(0.0401)	(0.0486)	(0.0228)	(0.0384)	(0.0478)	(0.0228)
AGE 30-49	-0.181***	-0.230***	-0.00176	-0.0903***	-0.169***	7.83e-06
	(0.0286)	(0.0346)	(0.0162)	(0.0272)	(0.0339)	(0.0162)
MIDDLE EDUCATION	0.110***	0.0294	-0.00636	0.0178	-0.00443	-0.0188
	(0.0376)	(0.0456)	(0.0214)	(0.0363)	(0.0452)	(0.0216)
HIGH EDUCATION	0.104***	0.0975**	-0.0610***	0.0260	0.0622	-0.0613***
	(0.0383)	(0.0465)	(0.0218)	(0.0368)	(0.0459)	(0.0219)
LOW INCOME	-0.257***	-0.175***	-0.107***	-0.204***	-0.0549	-0.0407*
	(0.0396)	(0.0481)	(0.0225)	(0.0398)	(0.0496)	(0.0236)
MIDDLE INCOME	-0.0268	-0.0488	-0.0424**	-0.0262	0.0228	-0.00685
	(0.0348)	(0.0422)	(0.0198)	(0.0343)	(0.0428)	(0.0204)
HIGH SOCIAL STATUS	0.220***	0.320***	0.306***	0.306***	0.379***	0.292***
	(0.0754)	(0.0915)	(0.0429)	(0.0715)	(0.0892)	(0.0425)
MIDDLE SOCIAL STATUS	0.119***	0.0455	0.0661***	0.0743***	0.0319	0.0527***
	(0.0264)	(0.0320)	(0.0150)	(0.0252)	(0.0315)	(0.0150)
VOTED FOR POLITICAL PARTIES	0.259***	0.140***	-0.0219	0.158***	0.0508	-0.0382*
	(0.0370)	(0.0449)	(0.0211)	(0.0353)	(0.0441)	(0.0210)
FINANCIALLY CONCERNED	-0.567***	-0.528***	-0.208***	-0.318***	-0.378***	-0.179***
	(0.0281)	(0.0341)	(0.0160)	(0.0288)	(0.0359)	(0.0171)
HAVING A SAY ON POLITICAL PARTIES	0.262***	0.477***	0.297***	0.250***	0.452***	0.295***
	(0.00513)	(0.00622)	(0.00292)	(0.00514)	(0.00641)	(0.00305)
TRUST IN OTHERS	0.226***	0.259***	0.161***	0.258***	0.285***	0.168***
	(0.00674)	(0.00818)	(0.00383)	(0.00656)	(0.00818)	(0.00390)
NATIVE	-0.154***	-0.288***	-0.159***	-0.0672*	-0.208***	-0.125***
	(0.0391)	(0.0475)	(0.0222)	(0.0376)	(0.0469)	(0.0224)
AUSTRALIA				0.126*	0.284***	-0.00152
				(0.0680)	(0.0849)	(0.0404)
AUSTRIA				0.383***	-0.0721	-0.0106
				(0.0661)	(0.0824)	(0.0393)
BELGIUM				0.0400	0.333***	0.112***
				(0.0687)	(0.0856)	(0.0408)
CANADA				-0.0179	0.458***	0.0503
				(0.0683)	(0.0852)	(0.0406)
COLOMBIA				-1.508***	-1.089***	-0.354***
				(0.0653)	(0.0814)	(0.0388)
DENMARK				0.615***	0.346***	-0.0345
				(0.0696)	(0.0868)	(0.0413)
ESTONIA				0.667***	1.004***	0.299***
				(0.0751)	(0.0936)	(0.0446)
ICELAND				0.332***	0.662***	-0.0744*
				(0.0753)	(0.0939)	(0.0448)
JAPAN				-0.0690	0.0674	-0.421***
				(0.0856)	(0.107)	(0.0509)
KOREA				-0.347***	0.217***	-0.00709
				(0.0638)	(0.0796)	(0.0379)

LATVIA				-0.00619	-0.0215	0.0319
				(0.0687)	(0.0857)	(0.0408)
LUXEMBOURG				0.787***	1.115***	0.244***
				(0.0777)	(0.0970)	(0.0462)
NETHERLANDS				0.210***	0.456***	0.0527
				(0.0673)	(0.0840)	(0.0400)
PORTUGAL				-0.0366	0.475***	-0.138***
				(0.0630)	(0.0786)	(0.0374)
SWEDEN				0.123*	0.363***	-0.0287
				(0.0743)	(0.0927)	(0.0442)
UNITED KINGDOM				0.350***	0.197**	0.0620
				(0.0664)	(0.0828)	(0.0395)
CONSTANT	-2.214***	-2.529***	-1.723***	-2.683***	-3.099***	-1.851***
	(0.105)	(0.128)	(0.0598)	(0.113)	(0.140)	(0.0669)
OBSERVATIONS	16,865	16,865	16,865	16,865	16,865	16,865
R-SQUARED	0.443	0.533	0.640	0.507	0.563	0.651

STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES
***** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1**
NOTE: BASE CATEGORIES: MALE, AGE 50+, LOW EDUCATION, HIGH INCOME, LOW SOCIAL STATUS, VOTING FOR POLITICAL PARTIES, HAVING A SAY ON POLITICAL PARTIES, NO TRUST IN OTHERS, MIGRANT, FRANCE

4.2 Governance quality is key for building trust

We conducted an additional analysis incorporating a newly devised factor, "Quality of Governance", as the independent variable. The results are shown in Table 3. The relationship between quality of governance and trust in institutions is complex and multifaceted and has been studied in the fields of political science, economics, and sociology. Several papers and studies have explored this relationship, offering insights into how the quality of governance influences trust in institutions and political outcomes.

Uslaner (2018) examines the determinants of trust in government institutions, including the role of governance quality. Uslaner (2018) argues that citizens are more likely to trust their government when it is perceived to be effective, fair, and accountable. High-quality governance, characterized by transparency, responsiveness, and the rule of law, is positively associated with trust in institutions. Another important study by Manzetti and Wilson (2006) investigates the factors driving confidence in government institutions, with a focus on the role of corruption and government performance. The authors find that countries with lower levels of corruption and greater government effectiveness tend to have higher levels of trust in government. Additionally, the research by Rothstein and Teorell (2008) sheds light on how the quality of government institutions influences citizens' trust. They argue that

high-level government institutions characterized by impartiality, neutrality, and low levels of corruption are more likely to generate trust among citizens.

TABLE 3: IMPACT OF QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE ON TRUST	TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS	TRUST IN POLITICS
FEMALE	-0.141***	-0.101***
	-0.0216	-0.0272
AGE 18-29	-0.260***	-0.272***
	-0.0335	-0.0421
AGE 30-49	-0.0903***	-0.169***
	-0.0237	-0.0299
MIDDLE EDUCATION	0.0333	0.0143
	-0.0317	-0.0399
HIGH EDUCATION	0.0762**	0.123***
	-0.0322	-0.0405
LOW INCOME	-0.171***	-0.0145
	-0.0347	-0.0437
MIDDLE INCOME	-0.0206	0.0296
	-0.03	-0.0377
HIGH SOCIAL STATUS	0.066	0.0885
	-0.0625	-0.0787
MIDDLE SOCIAL STATUS	0.0311	-0.0204
	-0.022	-0.0277
VOTED FOR POLITICAL PARTIES	0.190***	0.0888**
	-0.0309	-0.0388
FINANCIALLY CONCERNED	-0.172***	-0.200***
	-0.0253	-0.0318
HAVING A SAY ON POLITICAL PARTIES	0.00815	0.159***
	-0.00578	-0.00727
TRUST IN OTHERS	0.120***	0.118***
	-0.0061	-0.00767
NATIVE	-0.0351	0.0845**
	-0.0329	-0.0414
QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE	0.820***	0.993***
	-0.0124	-0.0156
AUSTRALIA	0.127**	0.285***
	-0.0594	-0.0747
AUSTRIA	0.391***	-0.0616
	-0.0577	-0.0726
BELGIUM	-0.0518	0.222***
	-0.06	-0.0755
CANADA	-0.0591	0.408***
	-0.0597	-0.0751
COLOMBIA	-1.219***	-0.738***
	-0.0572	-0.0719
DENMARK	0.643***	0.380***
	-0.0607	-0.0764
ESTONIA	0.422***	0.707***

	-0.0657	-0.0826
ICELAND	0.393***	0.736***
	-0.0658	-0.0827
JAPAN	0.276***	0.485***
	-0.0749	-0.0943
KOREA	-0.341***	0.224***
	-0.0558	-0.0702
LATIVA	-0.0323	-0.0531
	-0.06	-0.0755
LUXEMBOURG	0.587***	0.872***
	-0.068	-0.0855
NETHERLANDS	0.166***	0.404***
	-0.0588	-0.074
PORTUGAL	0.0767	0.613***
	-0.055	-0.0692
SWEDEN	0.146**	0.391***
	-0.0649	-0.0817
UNITED KINGDOM	0.299***	0.135*
	-0.058	-0.073
CONSTANT	-1.096***	-1.430***
	-0.0808	-0.102
OBSERVATIONS	16,865	16,865
R-SQUARED		

STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES

***** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1**

NOTE: BASE CATEGORIES: MALE, AGE 50+, LOW EDUCATION, HIGH INCOME, LOW SOCIAL STATUS, VOTING FOR POLITICAL PARTIES, HAVING A SAY ON POLITICAL PARTIES, NO TRUST IN OTHERS, MIGRANT, FRANCE

Overall, the literature suggests that there is a strong correlation between perceptions of governance quality and trust in institutions. When government institutions are perceived to be effective, transparent, and fair, citizens are more likely to have confidence in them. Conversely, corruption, inefficiency, and lack of accountability erode trust in institutions, highlighting the importance of high-quality governance for fostering trust and social cohesion.

The regression results provided in Table 3 reveal noteworthy coefficients of 0.820 for trust in institutions and 0.993 for trust in politics. Importantly, both coefficients exhibit statistical significance at the 1% level. These coefficients suggest that a higher perceived quality of governance positively influences trust in both institutions and politics. Specifically, for every one-unit increase in quality of governance, trust in institutions is expected to increase by 0.820 units and trust in politics is expected to increase almost by 1. This indicates a strong positive relationship between the perceived effectiveness of governance and trust in both institutional structures and political processes.

The significance of these coefficients underscores the importance of good governance in fostering trust among citizens. When individuals perceive governance to be effective, transparent, and responsive to their needs, they are more likely to trust both the institutions that govern them and the political processes

through which decisions are made. Conversely, poor governance characterized by corruption, inefficiency, or lack of accountability may erode trust in institutions and politics, contributing to societal discontent and political instability. Overall, these findings highlight the critical role of governance quality in shaping public trust, underscoring the significance of efforts to improve governance practices and to strengthen democratic institutions.

6. Checking the robustness of the determinants

The adoption of distributional regressions in econometrics and statistics has gained significant traction and interest. Due to its versatility in estimating unconditional quantile regression (UQR) and analyzing various distributional statistics, the re-centered influence functions (RIF) regression introduced by (Firpo et al. in 2009) is considered particularly useful. The RIF regression approach offers a flexible framework for examining the impact of explanatory variables on different quantiles of the dependent variable. This methodology stands out for its ability to capture the partial effects of explanatory variables on any unconditional quantile of interest. This feature empowers researchers to investigate the nuances of how the relationship between independent and dependent variables evolves across various quantiles, thereby providing a more comprehensive understanding of the underlying data dynamics.

One of the primary strengths of RIF regressions lies in their ability to offer insights into how the effects of explanatory variables vary across different segments of the distribution. Traditional regression approaches, such as ordinary least squares (OLS), often provide an average effect estimate across the entire distribution, masking potential heterogeneity in the relationship between variables. In contrast, RIF regressions enable researchers to uncover such heterogeneity by estimating quantile-specific effects, allowing for a more nuanced interpretation of the data. This capability is particularly valuable in fields in which understanding how the impact of certain factors differs across different segments of the population or distribution is essential, such as economics, sociology, and public policy.

Moreover, RIF regressions facilitate robust inference and estimation in the presence of non-linearities, heteroscedasticity, and heavy-tailed distributions, which are common features in many real-world datasets. By leveraging influence functions and re-centering techniques, RIF regressions provide reliable estimates even in the presence of outliers or influential observations, enhancing the robustness and reliability of the analysis. Additionally, RIF regressions offer the advantage of assessing the stability of coefficients across the distribution, allowing researchers to examine whether the relationship between variables remains consistent or varies significantly across different quantiles. This feature provides valuable insights into the reliability and generalizability of the estimated coefficients, further enhancing the interpretability and applicability of the analysis. Overall, the adoption of RIF regressions

offers researchers a powerful tool for gaining deeper insights into the complex relationships within their data, ultimately leading to more informed decision-making and policy formulation.



Figure 6: Quantile distribution of the three factor scores

The RIF regressions conducted for Trust in Institutions (presented in Table 4) provide significant insights into the determinants of trust levels across different quantiles (q10, q25, q50, q75, q90). Across the analysis, several key patterns emerge. Firstly, the data consistently indicate that females exhibit lower levels of trust in institutions across lower quantiles, with this gender disparity becoming less pronounced and not significant at higher quantiles. This suggests a persistent trend where females generally display lower trust in institutions compared to males. While our results differ from the OECD findings, we observe that the negative association between gender and trust is particularly evident in the lower part of the distribution. Additionally, younger age groups (18-29 and, especially, those aged 30-45) tend to show positive associations with trust in institutions across all quantiles, compared to older individuals. These findings appear to differ from those obtained through OLS estimation and the OECD results. Furthermore, the relationship between education and trust in institutions shows nuances across different quantiles. While a high education level tends to exhibit a positive association with trust at lower quantiles, this association becomes negative at higher quantiles. This indicates a complex relationship between education and trust that varies across different levels of trust. In addition, lower income levels consistently correlate with decreased trust across all quantiles, while a higher social status demonstrates a strong positive association with trust, particularly at higher quantiles. This highlights

the significant influence of socioeconomic factors on trust levels, with individuals of a higher social status generally displaying greater trust in institutions. Moreover, the analysis underscores the importance of political engagement in fostering trust in institutions. Having a say on political parties consistently correlates with institutional trust across upper quantiles, indicating the significance of political participation in shaping trust levels.

TABLE 4: RIF REGRESSIONS FOR TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS

	(q10)	(q25)	(q50)	(q75)	(q90)
VARIABLES	**Trust in Institutions**	**Trust in Institutions**	**Trust in Institutions**	**Trust in Institutions**	**Trust in Institutions**
FEMALE	-0.472***	-0.257***	-0.129***	-0.0130	0.0767***
	(0.0640)	(0.0412)	(0.0299)	(0.0271)	(0.0275)
AGE 18-29	0.315***	0.231***	0.195***	0.118***	0.0174
	(0.0999)	(0.0643)	(0.0467)	(0.0423)	(0.0429)
AGE 30-49	0.412***	0.303***	0.286***	0.222***	0.114***
	(0.0997)	(0.0642)	(0.0466)	(0.0422)	(0.0428)
MIDDLE EDUCATION	0.193**	0.157***	0.0863**	-0.110***	-0.210***
	(0.0915)	(0.0589)	(0.0428)	(0.0387)	(0.0393)
HIGH EDUCATION	0.254***	0.201***	0.127***	-0.0579	-0.203***
	(0.0920)	(0.0593)	(0.0430)	(0.0390)	(0.0395)
LOW INCOME	-0.520***	-0.230***	-0.226***	-0.105**	0.102**
	(0.104)	(0.0667)	(0.0484)	(0.0438)	(0.0445)
MIDDLE INCOME	-0.122	-0.0337	-0.100**	-0.0239	0.0640*
	(0.0896)	(0.0577)	(0.0419)	(0.0380)	(0.0385)
HIGH SOCIAL STATUS	-1.133***	-0.405***	0.0173	0.452***	1.245***
	(0.187)	(0.120)	(0.0873)	(0.0791)	(0.0802)
MIDDLE SOCIAL STATUS	0.431***	0.203***	-0.0330	-0.148***	-0.152***
	(0.0655)	(0.0421)	(0.0306)	(0.0277)	(0.0281)
VOTED FOR POLITICAL PARTIES	0.284***	0.133**	0.132***	0.126***	0.134***
	(0.0918)	(0.0591)	(0.0429)	(0.0389)	(0.0395)
FINANCIALLY CONCERNED	0.00107	-0.192***	-0.279***	-0.296***	-0.104***
	(0.0748)	(0.0482)	(0.0350)	(0.0317)	(0.0322)
HAVING A SAY ON POLITICAL PARTIES	-0.0136	0.00779	0.0185**	0.0273***	0.0153**
	(0.0171)	(0.0110)	(0.00798)	(0.00723)	(0.00734)
TRUST IN OTHERS	0.165***	0.158***	0.139***	0.103***	0.0753***
	(0.0181)	(0.0116)	(0.00846)	(0.00766)	(0.00777)
NATIVE	-0.0258	-0.157**	-0.0793*	0.0343	0.0433
	(0.0981)	(0.0632)	(0.0459)	(0.0415)	(0.0422)
QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE	1.380***	1.096***	0.801***	0.586***	0.433***
	(0.0366)	(0.0236)	(0.0171)	(0.0155)	(0.0157)
AUSTRALIA	0.00495	0.0378	0.128	0.342***	0.317***
	(0.185)	(0.119)	(0.0865)	(0.0783)	(0.0795)
AUSTRIA	0.319*	0.490***	0.390***	0.570***	0.514***
	(0.180)	(0.116)	(0.0841)	(0.0762)	(0.0773)
BELGIUM	-0.110	0.0796	-0.0827	-0.0724	-0.0552
	(0.187)	(0.120)	(0.0874)	(0.0791)	(0.0803)
CANADA	-0.263	-0.0420	-0.00204	0.0919	0.0321
	(0.186)	(0.120)	(0.0869)	(0.0787)	(0.0799)
COLOMBIA	-3.531***	-2.182***	-0.957***	-0.170**	0.0673
	(0.178)	(0.114)	(0.0831)	(0.0753)	(0.0764)
DENMARK	0.156	0.473***	0.793***	0.964***	0.828***
	(0.181)	(0.117)	(0.0848)	(0.0768)	(0.0779)
ESTONIA	-0.128	0.166	0.515***	0.883***	0.727***
	(0.204)	(0.131)	(0.0955)	(0.0865)	(0.0877)
ICELAND	0.527***	0.501***	0.539***	0.406***	0.153*
	(0.204)	(0.131)	(0.0953)	(0.0863)	(0.0876)
JAPAN	1.281***	0.719***	0.0135	0.0293	0.0868
	(0.232)	(0.149)	(0.108)	(0.0981)	(0.0996)
KOREA	-1.058***	-0.887***	-0.420***	0.194***	0.381***
	(0.174)	(0.112)	(0.0814)	(0.0737)	(0.0748)
LATVIA	-0.0785	-0.139	-0.135	0.174**	0.188**
	(0.187)	(0.120)	(0.0873)	(0.0790)	(0.0802)
LUXEMBOURG	0.384*	0.660***	0.834***	0.692***	0.484***
	(0.211)	(0.136)	(0.0986)	(0.0893)	(0.0906)
NETHERLANDS	0.0861	0.344***	0.330***	0.153**	-0.183**
	(0.182)	(0.118)	(0.0853)	(0.0773)	(0.0784)

PORTUGAL	0.349**	0.254**	-0.0625	-0.00942	0.0359
	(0.172)	(0.111)	(0.0805)	(0.0729)	(0.0740)
SWEDEN	-0.314	0.0625	0.251***	0.335***	0.359***
	(0.201)	(0.129)	(0.0939)	(0.0850)	(0.0863)
UNITED KINGDOM	0.316*	0.368***	0.342***	0.360***	0.189***
	(0.167)	(0.107)	(0.0780)	(0.0706)	(0.0717)
CONSTANT	-4.225***	-2.683***	-1.069***	0.192*	0.988***
	(0.248)	(0.160)	(0.116)	(0.105)	(0.107)
OBSERVATIONS	16,865	16,865	16,865	16,865	16,865
R-SQUARED	0.250	0.339	0.364	0.296	0.194

STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES

***** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1**
NOTE: BASE CATEGORIES: MALE, AGE 50+, LOW EDUCATION, HIGH INCOME, LOW SOCIAL STATUS, VOTING FOR POLITICAL PARTIES, HAVING A SAY ON POLITICAL PARTIES, NO TRUST IN OTHERS, MIGRANT, FRANCE

One particular coefficient of interest is that related to the quality of governance. The output suggests that this variable is positively and significantly associated with institutional trust across all quantiles, but with a varying magnitude. More specifically, quality of governance has a larger impact for low levels of trust, while it remains positive but has a lower impact at the higher levels, suggesting that quality of governance is particularly crucial to increasing institutional trust when levels are low.

Finally, the heterogeneous results across countries regarding trust levels, as indicated by the coefficients for different countries across quantiles, emphasize the influence of country-specific factors on trust in institutions. Overall, these findings offer valuable insights into the diverse determinants of trust in institutions across different quantiles, revealing the complex interplay between demographic, socioeconomic, and political factors.

Table (5) shows the results of the RIF regressions for Trust in Politics and provides significant insights into the factors influencing trust levels across different quantiles (q10, q25, q50, q75, q90). Female consistently demonstrates a negative correlation with trust in politics across lower quantiles, indicating that females tend to exhibit lower levels of trust in politics compared to males. This effect becomes less pronounced and is no longer significant at higher quantiles. Younger age groups, and particularly those aged 30-49, show positive associations with trust in politics across all quantiles. This suggests that as individuals age, their trust in political institutions tends to increase, irrespective of the specific quantile. Higher levels of education generally exhibit positive associations with trust in politics across lower quantiles, although the effect becomes negative at higher quantiles. Again, our findings indicate that education has a dual effect on trust, which differs from the OLS estimations and the results of the OECD report. Low income is negatively associated with trust in politics across low quantiles, while it has a positive and significant sign for higher levels of trust. Having a high social status demonstrates a strong positive correlation, particularly at higher quantiles, while it is negative at the lower tails. This highlights the significant influence of socioeconomic factors on trust in politics. Having a say on political parties consistently correlates with higher levels of trust in politics across all quantiles, underscoring the importance of political participation in fostering trust. The analysis reveals

heterogeneous country effects on trust levels, as indicated by the coefficients for different countries across the quantiles. The variable "Quality of Governance" again shows a positive and significant association with political trust. The magnitude of the coefficient is mostly stable across the quantiles, again suggesting the importance of this variable.

The RIF regressions for trust in institutions and trust in politics that include quality of governance as an independent variable expose a mixed landscape of factors shaping perceptions of institutional quality across different quantiles, presenting a rich avenue for motivation research. Understanding why certain demographic groups, such as females, consistently show lower levels of trust than others and how this perception evolves across quantiles could shed light on underlying collective dynamics and potential disparities in governance experiences. Exploring the varying impacts of age on perceptions of institutional quality and trust may uncover generational differences in expectations and experiences of governance. Similarly, investigating the divergent effects of education across quantiles could offer insights into the role of knowledge and awareness in shaping perceptions of governance. Exploring the influence of income, social status, political engagement, and interpersonal trust on governance perceptions may clarify the mechanisms through which socioeconomic factors and civic participation intersect with perceptions of institutional quality and, therefore, levels of trust. Additionally, examining country-specific effects could provide valuable comparative insights into the contextual factors driving divergent governance perceptions across nations. Such motivation research holds promise for informing targeted policy interventions aimed at fostering more inclusive, transparent, and effective governance structures that resonate with individuals with different levels of trust.

TABLE 5: RIF REGRESSIONS FOR TRUST IN POLITICS

	(Q10)	**(Q25)**	**(Q50)**	**(Q75)**	**(5)**
VARIABLES	TRUST IN POLITICS	TRUST IN POLITICS	TRUST IN POLITICS	TRUST IN POLITICS	TRUST IN POLITICS
FEMALE	-0.187***	-0.248***	-0.170***	-0.00422	0.0531
	(0.0504)	(0.0548)	(0.0421)	(0.0390)	(0.0453)
AGE 18-29	0.0103	-0.0127	0.126*	0.213***	0.153**
	(0.0787)	(0.0855)	(0.0657)	(0.0608)	(0.0707)
AGE 30-49	0.205***	0.219**	0.361***	0.390***	0.292***
	(0.0785)	(0.0853)	(0.0655)	(0.0607)	(0.0705)
MIDDLE EDUCATION	0.325***	0.193**	0.0275	-0.136**	-0.485***
	(0.0721)	(0.0783)	(0.0602)	(0.0557)	(0.0647)
HIGH EDUCATION	0.439***	0.386***	0.0946	-0.0813	-0.469***
	(0.0725)	(0.0787)	(0.0605)	(0.0560)	(0.0651)
LOW INCOME	-0.167**	-0.281***	-0.132*	0.0639	0.319***
	(0.0816)	(0.0886)	(0.0681)	(0.0630)	(0.0733)
MIDDLE INCOME	-0.0220	-0.0490	0.00175	0.00548	0.134**
	(0.0706)	(0.0767)	(0.0589)	(0.0546)	(0.0634)
HIGH SOCIAL STATUS	-1.086***	-1.028***	-0.239*	0.331***	2.069***
	(0.147)	(0.160)	(0.123)	(0.114)	(0.132)

MIDDLE SOCIAL STATUS	0.227***	0.301***	0.0241	-0.286***	-0.315***
	(0.0516)	(0.0560)	(0.0430)	(0.0399)	(0.0463)
VOTED FOR POLITICAL PARTIES	0.283***	0.0948	-0.0124	-0.0249	0.139**
	(0.0724)	(0.0786)	(0.0604)	(0.0559)	(0.0650)
FINANCIALLY CONCERNED	0.0412	-0.155**	-0.301***	-0.221***	-0.139***
	(0.0590)	(0.0640)	(0.0492)	(0.0456)	(0.0530)
HAVING A SAY ON POLITICAL PARTIES	0.0639***	0.184***	0.215***	0.171***	0.108***
	(0.0135)	(0.0146)	(0.0112)	(0.0104)	(0.0121)
TRUST IN OTHERS	0.0986***	0.119***	0.136***	0.125***	0.140***
	(0.0142)	(0.0155)	(0.0119)	(0.0110)	(0.0128)
NATIVE	-0.100	-0.0925	0.0356	0.149**	0.388***
	(0.0773)	(0.0839)	(0.0645)	(0.0597)	(0.0694)
QUALITY OF GOVERNANCE	0.993***	1.391***	1.082***	0.846***	0.714***
	(0.0288)	(0.0313)	(0.0241)	(0.0223)	(0.0259)
AUSTRALIA	-0.0869	-0.0610	0.373***	0.501***	0.686***
	(0.146)	(0.158)	(0.122)	(0.113)	(0.131)
AUSTRIA	-0.297**	-0.559***	0.0429	0.257**	0.375***
	(0.142)	(0.154)	(0.118)	(0.110)	(0.127)
BELGIUM	-0.225	0.158	0.499***	0.273**	0.246*
	(0.147)	(0.160)	(0.123)	(0.114)	(0.132)
CANADA	-0.229	-0.0345	0.770***	0.742***	0.554***
	(0.146)	(0.159)	(0.122)	(0.113)	(0.132)
COLOMBIA	-1.562***	-1.888***	-0.631***	-0.0143	0.325***
	(0.140)	(0.152)	(0.117)	(0.108)	(0.126)
DENMARK	0.184	0.419***	0.643***	0.669***	0.379***
	(0.143)	(0.155)	(0.119)	(0.110)	(0.128)
ESTONIA	0.472***	0.708***	0.687***	0.697***	1.038***
	(0.161)	(0.175)	(0.134)	(0.124)	(0.144)
ICELAND	0.429***	0.859***	1.130***	0.757***	0.364**
	(0.161)	(0.174)	(0.134)	(0.124)	(0.144)
JAPAN	0.919***	1.056***	0.492***	-0.0504	0.163
	(0.183)	(0.198)	(0.152)	(0.141)	(0.164)
KOREA	-0.124	-0.495***	-0.0967	0.691***	1.845***
	(0.137)	(0.149)	(0.115)	(0.106)	(0.123)
LATVIA	-0.311**	-0.696***	-0.0268	0.327***	0.462***
	(0.147)	(0.160)	(0.123)	(0.114)	(0.132)
LUXEMBOURG	0.571***	0.815***	1.006***	0.978***	1.000***
	(0.166)	(0.180)	(0.139)	(0.128)	(0.149)
NETHERLANDS	0.0815	0.516***	0.836***	0.348***	-0.0950
	(0.144)	(0.156)	(0.120)	(0.111)	(0.129)
PORTUGAL	0.507***	0.916***	0.701***	0.453***	0.405***
	(0.136)	(0.147)	(0.113)	(0.105)	(0.122)
SWEDEN	-0.0434	0.102	0.641***	0.771***	0.532***
	(0.158)	(0.172)	(0.132)	(0.122)	(0.142)
UNITED KINGDOM	0.288**	0.265*	0.195*	0.0799	0.0609
	(0.131)	(0.143)	(0.110)	(0.102)	(0.118)
CONSTANT	-5.014***	-3.570***	-1.736***	0.144	1.395***
	(0.196)	(0.213)	(0.163)	(0.151)	(0.176)

OBSERVATIONS	16,865	16,865	16,865	16,865	16,865
R-SQUARED	0.223	0.354	0.400	0.336	0.247

***STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES**
***** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1**
NOTE: BASE CATEGORIES: MALE, AGE 50+, LOW EDUCATION, HIGH INCOME, LOW SOCIAL STATUS, VOTING FOR POLITICAL PARTIES, HAVING A SAY ON POLITICAL PARTIES, NO TRUST IN OTHERS, MIGRANT, FRANCE

7. Conclusions

This study checks the consistency of conceptual model of trust described in Brezzi et al. (2020) which served as design for the OECD survey on trust in institutions and politics. Specifically, we use items, measuring the building blocks of the model which are integrity, responsiveness, reliability, openness, fairness, and satisfaction with public services. Confirmatory factor analysis uncovers three dimensions: trust in politics, trust in institutions and quality of governance. Our model demonstrates a high degree of fit across all countries and within each individual country. The robustness of measurement model will be crosschecked with data from the new survey of 2023.

These three dimensions produce an underlying ranking of countries based on their average median trust and quality of governance scores. We find that Denmark consistently ranks at the top, with the highest average scores, while Colombia ranks at the bottom in these dimensions. While the disparity hints at some intricate interplay of historical, cultural, and socioeconomic factors, this paper is limited to measurement issues and stops short of any systematic explanation. To explain why some countries are faring better than others, a two level regression technique, adding macroeconomic and social features at the national level should be used. Economic performance, societal cohesion and democratic process are among the likely determinants of trust in politics and institutions (Van der Meer and Hakhverdian, 2017). Evaluation of policy outcomes is at the core of trust in politics and institutions, provided citizens are making rational choices.

The trust scores, constructed through confirmatory factor analysis, are used as endogenous variables in a regression analysis where one of the key explaining variables is the factor score on quality of governance. The latter has a strong positive effect on trust in politics and institutions, ceteris paribus. This result seems important as it underscores the positive effect the qualitative dimension of services provided by government and it's agencies to the general public.

We also examine the impact of socioeconomic variables on the two trust factors and the quality of governance factor. Significant variables such as gender, income level, and social status align with the findings in the OECD report (Building Trust to Reinforce Democracy, OECD, 2022). Furthermore, given the continuous nature of the trust factors, we use distributional regression analysis in order to investigate the robustness of coefficients pertaining to socioeconomic characteristic. Our findings

indicate that the impact of gender, income, and social status on trust vary along the distribution. Specifically, gender and income have a negative and significant effect at lower levels of trust, but their impact becomes non-significant and even changes direction at higher levels of trust. This highlights the nuanced interpretation of the socioeconomic factors at different levels of trust. In order to search for a more parsimonious regression outcome, we envisage using also machine learning techniques.

This main issue of this paper is to assess the measurement model of trust and quality of governance across 18 countries. The next step is to validate the confirmatory factor model described in this paper using the second OECD drivers of trust pertaining to 2023. We will take into account economic and social characteristics at county level and focus in addition on the role of official statistics as certified information for policy evaluation and democratic decision making. (As in Allegrezza 2022)

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APPENIDX A: Questions from the OECD Documentation:

Question related to trust in Institution and Trust in Politics:

Q2. On a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 is not at all and 10 is completely, how much do you trust each of the following?

- The national government
- The local government
- The [parliament/congress]
- The political parties
- The police
- The civil service (non-elected government employees at central or local levels of government)
- The news media
- The courts and legal system
- International organisations

2.1. Integrity

Q3. If a high-level politician was offered the prospect of a well-paid job in the private sector in exchange for a political favour, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would refuse it?

- [Very unlikely – Very likely – Don't know]

[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

Q4. If a court is about to make a decision that could negatively impact on the government's image, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the court would make the decision free from political influence?

- [Very unlikely – Very likely – Don't know]

[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

Q5. If a public employee were offered money by a citizen or a firm for speeding up access to a public service, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would refuse it?

□ [Very unlikely – Very likely – Don't know]

[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

2.2 Responsiveness

Q6. If many people complained about a public service that is working badly, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be improved?

□ [Very unlikely – Very likely – Don't know]

[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

Q7. If there is an innovative idea that could improve a public service, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be adopted by the responsible [public agency/office]?

□ [Very unlikely – Very likely – Don't know]

[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

Q8. If over half of the people clearly express a view against a national policy, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that would be changed?

□ [Very unlikely – Very likely – Don't know]

[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

2.3 Reliability

Q9. If a new serious contagious disease spreads, how likely or unlikely do you think is it that government institutions will be prepared to protect people's life?

□ [Very unlikely – Very likely – Don't know]

[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

Q10. If you share your personal data with a [public agency/office], how likely or unlikely do you think it is that it would be exclusively used for legitimate purposes?

□ [Very unlikely – Very likely – Don't know]

[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Q11. How likely or unlikely do you think it is that the business conditions that the government can influence (e.g. laws and regulations businesses need to comply with) will be stable and predictable?

□ [Very unlikely – Very likely – Don't know]

[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

2.4 Openness

Q12. If a decision affecting your community is to be made by the local government, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that you would have an opportunity to voice your views?

 [Very unlikely – Very likely – Don't know]

[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

Q13. If you need information about an administrative procedure (for example obtaining a passport, applying for benefits, etc.), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the information would be easily available?

 [Very unlikely – Very likely – Don't know]

[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

Q14. If you participate in a public consultation on reforming a major policy area (e.g. taxation, healthcare, environmental protection), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that the government would adopt the opinions expressed in the public consultation?

 [Very unlikely – Very likely – Don't know]

[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

2.5. Fairness

Q15. If a public employee has contact with the public in the area where you live, how likely or unlikely is it that they would treat both rich and poor people equally?

 [Very unlikely – Very likely – Don't know]

[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

Q16. If a government employee interacts with the public in your area, how likely or unlikely do you think it is that they would treat all people equally regardless of their gender, sexual identity, ethnicity or country of origin?

 [Very unlikely – Very likely – Don't know]

[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

Q17. If you or a member of your family would apply for a government benefit or service (e.g. unemployment benefits or other forms of income support), how likely or unlikely do you think it is that your application would be treated fairly?

 [Very unlikely – Very likely – Don't know]

[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

SATISFACTION WITH PUBLIC SERVICES (5 questions)

Q18. On a scale of 0 to 10, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the [education system] in [COUNTRY] as a whole?

□ [Not at all satisfied – Completely satisfied – Don't know]

[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

Q19. On a scale of 0 to 10, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the [healthcare system] in [COUNTRY] as a whole?

□ [Not at all satisfied – Completely satisfied – Don't know]

[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

Q20. On a scale of 0 to 10, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the quality of administrative services (e.g. applying for an ID or a certificate of birth, death, marriage or divorce)

□ [Not at all satisfied – Completely satisfied – Don't know]

[0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10]

Q21. In the last 2 years, have you or any children you have been enrolled in an educational institution in [COUNTRY]?

□ Yes

□ No

□ Don't know

Q22. In the last 12 months, have you or somebody in your household had a direct experience with the healthcare system in [COUNTRY]?

□ Yes

□ No

□ Don't know

Appendix B: The Confirmatory model framework

The model estimates path coefficients between exogenous and endogenous factors.

(1) $x = \tau_X + \Lambda_X \xi + \delta$

(2) $y = \tau_Y + \Lambda_Y \eta + \varepsilon$

(3) Φ_{ξ_k}

(4) $\eta = \alpha + B\eta + \Gamma\xi + \zeta$

The general structural equation model (SEM) is specified by a four-equation system:

1. The measurement model of the exogenous factors **ξ**;
2. The measurement model of the endogenous factors **η**;
3. The covariance / correlation matrix of the exogenous factor **Φ**;

4. The regression equations of the endogenous factors on the exogenous factors containing the path coefficients in the **B** and **Γ** matrices.

Appendix C: Loading Estimates of the Structural Model

Table: Loading estimates and standard errors of the Structural-Equation-Second-Order Factor Model

1st order factor	Indicator	Standardized Loading	S.E.	Standardized measurement error	S.E.
Trust in Politics	q2_1	0.858***	0.008	0.263***	0.014
	q2_2	0.760***	0.011	0.423***	0.017
	q2_3	0.907***	0.008	0.177***	0.014
	q2_4	0.835***	0.009	0.303***	0.015
Trust in Institutions	q2_5	0.747***	0.018	0.442***	0.026
	q2_6	0.758***	0.013	0.426***	0.020
	q2_8	0.752***	0.015	0.434***	0.023
Satisfaction with public services	q18	0.706***	0.016	0.502***	0.023
	q19	0.620***	0.020	0.616***	0.025
	q20	0.719***	0.016	0.483***	0.024
Integrity	q3	0.566***	0.025	0.680***	0.028
	q4	0.682***	0.020	0.535***	0.027
	q5	0.634***	0.023	0.599***	0.030
Responsiveness	q6	0.839***	0.011	0.296***	0.018
	q7	0.779***	0.012	0.393***	0.018
	q8	0.720***	0.016	0.481***	0.023
Reliability	q9	0.733***	0.013	0.463***	0.019
	q10	0.601***	0.022	0.639***	0.026
	q11	0.741***	0.016	0.450***	0.023
Openness	q12	0.631***	0.017	0.602***	0.022
	q13	0.529***	0.021	0.720***	0.022
	q14	0.767***	0.014	0.411***	0.022
Fairness	q15	0.813***	0.014	0.338***	0.023
	q16	0.815***	0.014	0.336***	0.023
	q17	0.688***	0.016	0.527***	0.022
2nd order factor	1st order factor				
Quality of Governance	Satisfaction	0.766***	0.019	0.413***	0.029
	Integrity	0.800***	0.021	0.360***	0.033
	Responsiveness	0.841***	0.012	0.293***	0.020
	Reliability	0.955***	0.010	0.089***	0.020
	Openness	0.916***	0.019	0.161***	0.034
	Fairness	0.833***	0.014	0.306***	0.024
Factor correlations					
Trust in institutions	Trust in politics	0.758***	0.016		
Quality of Governance	Trust in politics	0.782***	0.014		
Quality of Governance	Trust in institutions	0.781***	0.017		

Model fit:				Fit-indices:
L.R.chi²- statistics		D.F.=	p=	RMSEA = 0.015
M_A =	1590.007	266	0.000	CFI = 0.915
M_Baseline =	15811.475	300	0.000	TLI = 0.904
SB-Scaling factor =	19.375			SRMR = 0.043
N = 22,554				
Legend:				
*) p < 0.05 **) p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001				

The second-order factor model was estimated using MPlus 8.10 and Stata 18, incorporating the weight variable *weight*. Additionally, the Satorra-Bentler correction was applied in MPlus to adjust the likelihood ratio chi-square (χ2\chi^2χ2) values and the standard errors of the parameters, as the observed indicators in our model deviate from the assumption of multivariate normality. Both software packages yielded identical estimates for the first- and second-order factor loadings and factor correlations. In the standardized solution, the factor variance was constrained to one.

Appendix D: RIF (Re-Centered Influence Functions) regressions without Quality of Governance

TABLE D1: RIF REGRESSIONS FOR TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS

	q10	q25	q50	q75	q90
VARIABLES	Trust in Institutions	Trust in Institutions	Trust in Institutions	Trust in Institutions	Trust in Institutions
FEMALE	-0.493***	-0.273***	-0.141***	-0.0219	0.0701**
	(0.0666)	(0.0438)	(0.0318)	(0.0282)	(0.0281)
AGE 30-49	0.375***	0.278***	0.230***	0.143***	0.0362
	(0.104)	(0.0683)	(0.0497)	(0.0441)	(0.0439)
AGE 50-_OVER	0.467***	0.347***	0.318***	0.245***	0.131***
	(0.104)	(0.0682)	(0.0495)	(0.0440)	(0.0438)
MIDDLE EDUCATION	0.150	0.122*	0.0614	-0.128***	-0.224***
	(0.0953)	(0.0626)	(0.0455)	(0.0403)	(0.0402)
HIGH EDUCATION	0.165*	0.131**	0.0756*	-0.0955**	-0.231***
	(0.0958)	(0.0629)	(0.0457)	(0.0406)	(0.0404)
LOW INCOME	-0.578***	-0.276***	-0.259***	-0.129***	0.0838*
	(0.108)	(0.0708)	(0.0515)	(0.0457)	(0.0455)
MIDDLE INCOME	-0.123	-0.0347	-0.101**	-0.0244	0.0636
	(0.0933)	(0.0613)	(0.0446)	(0.0395)	(0.0394)
HIGH SOCIAL STATUS	-0.697***	-0.0588	0.270***	0.637***	1.382***
	(0.194)	(0.127)	(0.0926)	(0.0822)	(0.0818)
MIDDLE SOCIAL STATUS	0.497***	0.255***	0.00543	-0.120***	-0.131***
	(0.0681)	(0.0448)	(0.0325)	(0.0289)	(0.0287)
VOTED FOR POLITICAL PARTIES	0.228**	0.0894	0.0997**	0.102**	0.117***
	(0.0956)	(0.0628)	(0.0456)	(0.0405)	(0.0403)
FINANCIALLY CONCERNED	-0.250***	-0.391***	-0.424***	-0.403***	-0.183***
	(0.0776)	(0.0510)	(0.0371)	(0.0329)	(0.0327)

HAVING A SAY ON POLITICAL PARTIES	0.393***	0.331***	0.255***	0.200***	0.143***
	(0.0138)	(0.00904)	(0.00657)	(0.00583)	(0.00581)
TRUST IN OTHERS	0.397***	0.342***	0.273***	0.201***	0.148***
	(0.0177)	(0.0116)	(0.00845)	(0.00750)	(0.00747)
NATIVE	-0.152	0.0160	-0.0240	-0.110**	-0.0992**
	(0.102)	(0.0670)	(0.0487)	(0.0432)	(0.0430)
AUSTRALIA	0.00995	0.0418	0.131	0.344***	0.319***
	(0.193)	(0.126)	(0.0919)	(0.0816)	(0.0812)
AUSTRIA	0.299	0.474***	0.379***	0.561***	0.508***
	(0.187)	(0.123)	(0.0894)	(0.0794)	(0.0790)
BELGIUM	0.0487	0.206	0.00932	-0.00499	-0.00537
	(0.195)	(0.128)	(0.0928)	(0.0824)	(0.0820)
CANADA	-0.201	0.00698	0.0338	0.118	0.0515
	(0.194)	(0.127)	(0.0924)	(0.0820)	(0.0817)
COLOMBIA	-4.025***	-2.574***	-1.244***	-0.380***	-0.0880
	(0.185)	(0.121)	(0.0881)	(0.0782)	(0.0779)
DENMARK	0.124	0.448***	0.775***	0.950***	0.818***
	(0.189)	(0.124)	(0.0901)	(0.0800)	(0.0797)
ESTONIA	0.290	0.498***	0.757***	1.061***	0.859***
	(0.212)	(0.139)	(0.101)	(0.0899)	(0.0896)
ICELAND	0.416**	0.412***	0.475***	0.359***	0.118
	(0.212)	(0.139)	(0.101)	(0.0899)	(0.0895)
JAPAN	0.735***	0.286*	-0.303***	-0.203**	-0.0846
	(0.241)	(0.158)	(0.115)	(0.102)	(0.102)
KOREA	-1.066***	-0.893***	-0.424***	0.191**	0.379***
	(0.181)	(0.119)	(0.0865)	(0.0768)	(0.0765)
LATVIA	-0.0328	-0.102	-0.108	0.194**	0.202**
	(0.194)	(0.128)	(0.0928)	(0.0823)	(0.0820)
LUXEMBOURG	0.722***	0.929***	1.030***	0.835***	0.590***
	(0.219)	(0.144)	(0.105)	(0.0929)	(0.0926)
NETHERLANDS	0.165	0.407***	0.376***	0.186**	-0.158**
	(0.190)	(0.125)	(0.0907)	(0.0805)	(0.0802)
PORTUGAL	0.163	0.106	-0.171**	-0.0885	-0.0226
	(0.179)	(0.118)	(0.0855)	(0.0759)	(0.0756)
SWEDEN	-0.344	0.0388	0.233**	0.322***	0.349***
	(0.209)	(0.137)	(0.0998)	(0.0886)	(0.0882)
UNITED KINGDOM	0.426**	0.456***	0.405***	0.406***	0.224***
	(0.174)	(0.114)	(0.0829)	(0.0735)	(0.0732)
CONSTANT	-6.872***	-5.059***	-2.733***	-0.842***	0.259**
	(0.312)	(0.205)	(0.149)	(0.132)	(0.132)
OBSERVATIONS	16,865	16,865	16,865	16,865	16,865
R-SQUARED	0.187	0.254	0.281	0.236	0.158

STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES

***** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1**

Table D2: RIF regressions for Trust in Politics

	Q10	Q25	Q50	Q75	Q90
VARIABLES	Trust in Politics	Trust in Politics	Trust in Politics	Trust in Politics	Trust in Politics
FEMALE	-0.202***	-0.269***	-0.186***	-0.0170	0.0423
	(0.0522)	(0.0579)	(0.0445)	(0.0406)	(0.0463)
AGE 30-49	0.0533	0.0476	0.173**	0.250***	0.184**
	(0.0814)	(0.0903)	(0.0695)	(0.0634)	(0.0723)
AGE 50-OVER	0.245***	0.275***	0.405***	0.423***	0.320***
	(0.0812)	(0.0901)	(0.0694)	(0.0632)	(0.0721)
MIDDLE EDUCATION	0.294***	0.150*	-0.00623	-0.162***	-0.508***
	(0.0746)	(0.0827)	(0.0637)	(0.0580)	(0.0662)
HIGH EDUCATION	0.375***	0.297***	0.0253	-0.136**	-0.515***
	(0.0750)	(0.0832)	(0.0640)	(0.0584)	(0.0666)
LOW INCOME	-0.208**	-0.339***	-0.177**	0.0285	0.289***
	(0.0844)	(0.0936)	(0.0720)	(0.0657)	(0.0749)
MIDDLE INCOME	-0.0229	-0.0503	0.000761	0.00470	0.134**
	(0.0731)	(0.0811)	(0.0624)	(0.0569)	(0.0649)
HIGH SOCIAL STATUS	-0.772***	-0.589***	0.102	0.599***	2.295***
	(0.152)	(0.168)	(0.130)	(0.118)	(0.135)
MIDDLE SOCIAL STATUS	0.275***	0.368***	0.0760*	-0.246***	-0.280***
	(0.0533)	(0.0592)	(0.0455)	(0.0415)	(0.0473)
VOTED FOR POLITICAL PARTIES	0.244***	0.0389	-0.0559	-0.0589	0.110*
	(0.0749)	(0.0831)	(0.0639)	(0.0583)	(0.0664)
FINANCIALLY CONCERNED	-0.139**	-0.407***	-0.498***	-0.375***	-0.269***
	(0.0608)	(0.0674)	(0.0519)	(0.0473)	(0.0539)
HAVING A SAY ON POLITICAL PARTIES	0.357***	0.594***	0.534***	0.420***	0.319***
	(0.0108)	(0.0120)	(0.00920)	(0.00839)	(0.00957)
TRUST IN OTHERS	0.265***	0.352***	0.317***	0.266***	0.260***
	(0.0139)	(0.0154)	(0.0118)	(0.0108)	(0.0123)
NATIVE	-0.0278	-0.0870	-0.175**	-0.259***	-0.480***
	(0.0799)	(0.0886)	(0.0682)	(0.0622)	(0.0709)
AUSTRALIA	-0.0833	-0.0560	0.377***	0.504***	0.689***
	(0.151)	(0.167)	(0.129)	(0.117)	(0.134)
AUSTRIA	-0.311**	-0.579***	0.0274	0.245**	0.365***
	(0.147)	(0.163)	(0.125)	(0.114)	(0.130)
BELGIUM	-0.110	0.317*	0.623***	0.370***	0.328**
	(0.152)	(0.169)	(0.130)	(0.118)	(0.135)
CANADA	-0.185	0.0277	0.818***	0.779***	0.586***
	(0.152)	(0.168)	(0.129)	(0.118)	(0.135)
COLOMBIA	-1.917***	-2.386***	-1.019***	-0.317***	0.0691
	(0.145)	(0.160)	(0.123)	(0.112)	(0.128)
DENMARK	0.162	0.387**	0.618***	0.649***	0.363***
	(0.148)	(0.164)	(0.126)	(0.115)	(0.131)
ESTONIA	0.774***	1.130***	1.016***	0.954***	1.255***
	(0.166)	(0.184)	(0.142)	(0.129)	(0.147)
ICELAND	0.349**	0.747***	1.043***	0.689***	0.306**

	(0.166)	(0.184)	(0.142)	(0.129)	(0.147)
JAPAN	0.526***	0.506**	0.0644	-0.385***	-0.119
	(0.189)	(0.209)	(0.161)	(0.147)	(0.167)
KOREA	-0.130	-0.502***	-0.102	0.686***	1.841***
	(0.142)	(0.157)	(0.121)	(0.110)	(0.126)
LATVIA	-0.278*	-0.650***	0.00910	0.355***	0.485***
	(0.152)	(0.169)	(0.130)	(0.118)	(0.135)
LUXEMBOURG	0.815***	1.156***	1.271***	1.185***	1.175***
	(0.172)	(0.191)	(0.147)	(0.134)	(0.152)
NETHERLANDS	0.138	0.596***	0.898***	0.396***	-0.0543
	(0.149)	(0.165)	(0.127)	(0.116)	(0.132)
PORTUGAL	0.373***	0.729***	0.555***	0.339***	0.309**
	(0.140)	(0.156)	(0.120)	(0.109)	(0.125)
SWEDEN	-0.0648	0.0724	0.617***	0.753***	0.516***
	(0.164)	(0.182)	(0.140)	(0.127)	(0.145)
UNITED KINGDOM	0.367***	0.376**	0.282**	0.147	0.118
	(0.136)	(0.151)	(0.116)	(0.106)	(0.121)
CONSTANT	-7.082***	-6.370***	-3.699***	-1.148***	0.829***
	(0.245)	(0.271)	(0.209)	(0.190)	(0.217)
OBSERVATIONS	16,865	16,865	16,865	16,865	16,865
R-SQUARED	0.168	0.278	0.328	0.279	0.213
STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES					
***** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1**					

Table D3: RIF regressions for Quality of Governance

	(1)	**(2)**	**(3)**	**(4)**	**(5)**
VARIABLES	Quality of Governance	Quality of Governance	Quality of Governance	Quality of Governance	Quality of Governance
FEMALE	-0.193***	-0.0746***	0.0475**	0.0792***	0.0623**
	(0.0363)	(0.0247)	(0.0205)	(0.0218)	(0.0280)
AGE 30-49	-0.0613	-0.00492	0.0266	0.166***	0.115***
	(0.0567)	(0.0385)	(0.0320)	(0.0340)	(0.0437)
AGE 50-_OVER	-0.0777	0.0343	0.0805**	0.146***	-0.00640
	(0.0566)	(0.0385)	(0.0319)	(0.0340)	(0.0436)
MIDDLE EDUCATION	0.0908*	0.0568	0.0168	-0.0971***	-0.305***
	(0.0520)	(0.0353)	(0.0293)	(0.0312)	(0.0401)
HIGH EDUCATION	0.0124	0.0567	0.00101	-0.125***	-0.350***
	(0.0522)	(0.0355)	(0.0294)	(0.0314)	(0.0403)
LOW INCOME	-0.163***	-0.0806**	-0.0924***	0.0303	0.0918**
	(0.0588)	(0.0399)	(0.0331)	(0.0353)	(0.0453)
MIDDLE INCOME	0.0242	0.0232	-0.0492*	-0.0113	0.0143
	(0.0509)	(0.0346)	(0.0287)	(0.0306)	(0.0393)
HIGH SOCIAL STATUS	-0.349***	-0.268***	-0.0218	0.459***	1.804***
	(0.106)	(0.0719)	(0.0596)	(0.0635)	(0.0816)
MIDDLE SOCIAL STATUS	0.385***	0.234***	0.0402*	-0.174***	-0.241***
	(0.0372)	(0.0252)	(0.0209)	(0.0223)	(0.0287)
VOTED FOR POLITICAL PARTIES	-0.0834	-0.0462	-0.0470	-0.0472	0.0458
	(0.0522)	(0.0354)	(0.0294)	(0.0313)	(0.0402)

FINANCIALLY CONCERNED	-0.306***	-0.202***	-0.232***	-0.174***	-0.107***
	(0.0423)	(0.0288)	(0.0238)	(0.0254)	(0.0326)
HAVING A SAY ON POLITICAL PARTIES	0.326***	0.330***	0.308***	0.287***	0.247***
	(0.00751)	(0.00510)	(0.00423)	(0.00451)	(0.00579)
TRUST IN OTHERS	0.191***	0.151***	0.163***	0.165***	0.170***
	(0.00966)	(0.00656)	(0.00544)	(0.00580)	(0.00745)
NATIVE	0.0797	-0.0291	-0.0802**	-0.213***	-0.419***
	(0.0556)	(0.0378)	(0.0313)	(0.0334)	(0.0429)
AUSTRALIA	-0.302***	-0.184***	0.0566	0.147**	0.338***
	(0.105)	(0.0714)	(0.0592)	(0.0630)	(0.0810)
AUSTRIA	0.0243	-0.0591	0.0237	0.0406	0.118
	(0.102)	(0.0694)	(0.0576)	(0.0613)	(0.0788)
BELGIUM	0.0268	0.105	0.184***	0.170***	0.136*
	(0.106)	(0.0721)	(0.0598)	(0.0637)	(0.0818)
CANADA	-0.232**	-0.113	0.164***	0.192***	0.356***
	(0.106)	(0.0717)	(0.0595)	(0.0634)	(0.0814)
COLOMBIA	-1.071***	-0.693***	-0.251***	0.0542	0.238***
	(0.101)	(0.0684)	(0.0567)	(0.0604)	(0.0776)
DENMARK	-0.299***	-0.0956	0.116**	0.115*	0.185**
	(0.103)	(0.0700)	(0.0580)	(0.0618)	(0.0794)
ESTONIA	0.150	0.318***	0.423***	0.386***	0.415***
	(0.116)	(0.0787)	(0.0652)	(0.0695)	(0.0893)
ICELAND	-0.0992	-0.0197	-0.00704	-0.0822	-0.164*
	(0.116)	(0.0786)	(0.0652)	(0.0695)	(0.0892)
JAPAN	-0.0133	-0.444***	-0.555***	-0.482***	-0.249**
	(0.131)	(0.0893)	(0.0740)	(0.0788)	(0.101)
KOREA	-0.452***	-0.329***	-0.0684	0.286***	1.003***
	(0.0989)	(0.0672)	(0.0557)	(0.0593)	(0.0762)
LATVIA	-0.136	-0.0841	0.127**	0.124*	0.140*
	(0.106)	(0.0720)	(0.0597)	(0.0636)	(0.0817)
LUXEMBOURG	0.112	0.264***	0.346***	0.278***	0.315***
	(0.120)	(0.0813)	(0.0674)	(0.0718)	(0.0923)
NETHERLANDS	0.0966	0.152**	0.265***	-0.0438	-0.199**
	(0.104)	(0.0704)	(0.0584)	(0.0622)	(0.0799)
PORTUGAL	-0.192**	-0.229***	-0.116**	-0.0636	0.0637
	(0.0977)	(0.0664)	(0.0551)	(0.0587)	(0.0754)
SWEDEN	-0.447***	-0.260***	0.205***	0.208***	0.251***
	(0.114)	(0.0775)	(0.0642)	(0.0684)	(0.0879)
UNITED KINGDOM	0.0693	0.104	0.223***	0.0752	-0.0334
	(0.0947)	(0.0643)	(0.0533)	(0.0568)	(0.0730)
CONSTANT	-3.983***	-2.899***	-2.023***	-0.880***	0.373***
	(0.170)	(0.116)	(0.0960)	(0.102)	(0.131)
OBSERVATIONS	16,865	16,865	16,865	16,865	16,865
R-SQUARED	0.200	0.323	0.392	0.349	0.276

STANDARD ERRORS IN PARENTHESES
***** P<0.01, ** P<0.05, * P<0.1**

Table D4: Adding the confidence on the ability to participate in the politics

VARIABLES	TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS	TRUST IN POLITICS	QUALITY_OF_GOVERNANCE
FEMALE	-0.153***	-0.119***	-0.0178
	-0.0252	-0.0315	-0.015
AGE18-29	-0.289***	-0.308***	-0.0384*
	-0.0387	-0.0482	-0.023
AGE30-49	-0.0871***	-0.162***	0.00804
	-0.0274	-0.0342	-0.0163
MIDLE EDUCATION	0.0128	-0.0116	-0.0197
	-0.0366	-0.0457	-0.0218
HIGH EDUCATION	0.0249	0.0564	-0.0631***
	-0.0372	-0.0464	-0.0221
LOW INCOME	-0.205***	-0.0485	-0.0323
	-0.0402	-0.0501	-0.0239
MIDLE INCOME	-0.0244	0.0282	-0.00474
	-0.0346	-0.0432	-0.0206
HIGH SOCIAL STATUS	0.316***	0.386***	0.290***
	-0.0718	-0.0896	-0.0427
MIDLE SOCIAL STATUS	0.0767***	0.0363	0.0549***
	-0.0255	-0.0318	-0.0151
VOTED FOR THE POLITICAL PARTIES	0.156***	0.0504	-0.0361*
	-0.0358	-0.0446	-0.0213
FINANCIALY CONCERCNED	-0.320***	-0.385***	-0.178***
	-0.0291	-0.0363	-0.0173
HAVING A SAY ON THE POLITICAL PARTIES	0.251***	0.449***	0.293***
	-0.00574	-0.00716	-0.00341
CONFIDENCE IN THE ABILITY TO PARTICIPATE IN POLITICS	-0.00324	0.0016	0.00272
	-0.00532	-0.00663	-0.00316
TRUST IN OTHERS	0.257***	0.284***	0.168***
	-0.00663	-0.00827	-0.00394
NATIVE	0.0644*	0.198***	0.123***
	-0.0379	-0.0473	-0.0225

AUSTRALIA	0.120*	0.265***	-0.00926
	-0.0685	-0.0854	-0.0407
AUSTRIA	0.365***	-0.0927	-0.0205
	-0.0668	-0.0833	-0.0397
BELGIUM	0.0346	0.330***	0.108***
	-0.0693	-0.0864	-0.0411
CANADA	-0.0221	0.446***	0.0425
	-0.0689	-0.0859	-0.0409
COLOMBIA	-1.504***	-1.100***	-0.363***
	-0.0663	-0.0827	-0.0394
DENMARK	0.615***	0.341***	-0.0423
	-0.07	-0.0873	-0.0416
ESTONIA	0.655***	0.988***	0.291***
	-0.0757	-0.0944	-0.0449
ICELAND	0.341***	0.657***	-0.0733
	-0.0757	-0.0944	-0.0449
JAPAN	-0.0774	0.0534	-0.423***
	-0.0862	-0.107	-0.0512
KOREA	-0.343***	0.225***	-0.00723
	-0.0642	-0.0801	-0.0381
LATIVA	-0.0236	-0.0428	0.0215
	-0.0692	-0.0863	-0.0411
LUXEMBOURG	0.782***	1.108***	0.239***
	-0.0782	-0.0976	-0.0465
NETHERLANDS	0.208***	0.456***	0.049
	-0.0679	-0.0847	-0.0403
PORTUGAL	-0.0462	0.465***	-0.150***
	-0.0634	-0.079	-0.0376
SWEDEN	0.0971	0.326***	-0.048
	-0.0755	-0.0941	-0.0448
UNITED KINGDOM	0.345***	0.173**	0.0456
	-0.0669	-0.0835	-0.0397
CONSTANT	-2.798***	-3.498***	-2.111***
	-0.0889	-0.111	-0.0528
OBSERVATIONS	16,609	16,609	16,609
R-SQUARED	0.508	0.564	0.653