Theoretical Economics

Volume 9, n° 3, September 2014

• CARBONELL-NICOLAU Oriol, McLEAN Richard P. - Refinements of Nash equilibrium in potential games, pp. 555-582 (texte)
• ACEMOGLU Daron, HAWKINS William B. - Search with multi-worker firms, pp. 583-628 (texte)
• ASHEIM Geir B., ZUBER Stéphane - Escaping the repugnant conclusion: rank-discounted utilitarianism with variable population, pp. 629-650 (texte)
• PESKI Marcin - Repeated games with incomplete information and discounting, pp. 651-694 (texte)
• KÖNIG Michael D., TESSONE Claudio J., ZENOU Yves - Nestedness in networks: A theoretical model and some applications, pp. 695-752 (texte)
• ANDERSSON Tommy, EHLERS Lars, SVENSSON Lars-Gunnar - Budget-balance, fairness and minimal manipulability, pp. 753-777 (texte)
• GIRAUD Raphaël - Second order beliefs models of choice under imprecise risk: non-additive second order beliefs vs. nonlinear second order utility, pp. 779-816 (texte)
• ASHLAGI Itai, ROTH Alvin E. - Free riding and participation in large scale, multi-hospital kidney exchange, pp. 817-863 (texte)
• PRAT Julien, JOVANOVIC Boyan - Dynamic contracts when agent'’s quality is unknown, pp. 865-914 (texte)
• DEMANGE Gabrielle - A ranking method based on handicaps, pp. 915-942 (texte)

Volume 9, n° 2, May 2014

• ABREU Dilip, SANNIKOV Yuliy - An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring, pp. 313-338 (texte)
• BÖRGERS Tilman, SMITH Doug - Robust mechanism design and dominant strategy voting rules, pp. 339-360 (texte)
• GOSWAMI Mridu Prabal, MITRA Manipushpak, SEN Arunava - Strategy-proofness and Pareto-efficiency in quasi-linear exchange economies , pp. 361-381 (texte)
• KAMIHIGASHI Takashi, STACHURSKI John - Stochastic stability in monotone economies, pp. 383-407 (texte)
• CALCAGNO Riccardo, KAMADA Yuichiro, LOVO Stefano, SUGAYA Takuo - Asynchronicity and coordination in common and opposing interest games, pp. 409-434 (texte)
• BALASKO Yves - The transfer problem: A complete characterization, pp. 435-444 (texte)
• ANESI Vincent, SEIDMANN Daniel J. - Bargaining over an endogenous agenda, pp. 445-482 (texte)
• CHEN Ying, ERASLAN Hulya - Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information, pp. 483-513 (texte)
• BATTAGLINI Marco - A dynamic theory of electoral competition, pp. 515-554 (texte)

Volume 9, n° 1, January 2014

• ATTAR Andrea, MARIOTTI Thomas, SALANIE François - Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection, pp. 1-40 (texte)
• ACEMOGLU Daron, BIMPIKIS Kostas, OZDAGLAR Asuman - Dynamics of information exchange in endogenous social networks, pp. 41-97 (texte)
• SHER Itai - Persuasion and dynamic communication, pp. 99-136 (texte)
• CHAMBERS Christopher P., ECHENIQUE Federico - On the consistency of data with bargaining theories, pp. 137-162 (texte)
• SOBEL Joel - On the relationship between individual and group decisions, pp. 163-185 (texte)
• VARTIAINEN Hannu - Endogenous agenda formation processes with the one-deviation property, pp. 187-216 (texte)
• HEIDHUES Paul, KÖSZEGI Botond - Regular prices and sales, pp. 217-251 (texte)
• HASHIMOTO Tadashi, HIRATA Daisuke, KESTEN Onur, KURINO Morimitsu, ÜNVER M. UTKU - Two aciomatic approaches to the probabilistic serial mechanism, pp. 253-277 (texte)
• NAVA Francesco, PICCIONE Michele - Efficiency in repeated games with local interaction and uncertain local monitoring, pp. 279-312 (texte)