Theoretical Economics - Journal of the Econometric Society

FRICK Mira - Monotone threshold representations, pp. 757-772 (texte)
KLEIN Nicolas - The importance of being honest, pp. 773-811 (texte)
KÖNIG Michael David - The formation of networks with local spillovers and limited observability, pp. 813-863 (texte)
ELLIS Andrew - Condorcet meets Ellsberg, pp. 865-895 (texte)
GEROMICHALOS Athanasios, HERRENBRUECK ucas M., SALYER Kevin D. - A search-theoretic model of the term premium, pp. 897-935 (texte)
GAYER Gabrielle, PERSITZ Dotan - Negotiation across multiple issues, pp. 937-969 (texte)
WOLITZKY Alexander - Mechanism design with maxmin agents: theory and an application to bilateral trade, pp. 971-1004 (texte)
GOMES Renato, PAVAN Alessandro - Many-to-many matching and price discrimination, pp. 1005-1052 (texte)
KÖNIG Michael, LORENZ Jan, ZILIBOTTI Fabrizio - Innovation vs. imitation and the evolution of productivity distributions, pp. 1053-1102 (texte)
FUCHS William, ÖRY Aniko, SKRZYPACZ Andrzej - Transparency and distressed sales under asymmetric information, pp. 1103-1144 (texte)
CHASSANG Sylvain, ZEHNDER Christian - Rewards and punishments: informal contracting through social preferences, pp. 1145-1179 (texte)

BERNARD Benjamin, FREI Christoph - The folk theorem with imperfect public information in continuous time, pp. 411-453 (texte)
CARBAJAL Juan Carlos, ELY Jeffrey C. - A model of price discrimination under loss aversion and state-contingent reference points, pp. 455-485 (texte)
BERGEMANN Dirk, MORRIS Stephen - Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games, pp. 487-522 (texte)
CERREIS-VIOGLIO Simone - Objective rationality and uncertainty averse preferences, pp. 523-545 (texte)
ARRIBILLAGA R. Pablo, MASSÓ Jordi - Comparing generalized median voter schemes according to their manipulability, pp. 547-586 (texte)
YILDIZ Kemal - List-rationalizable choice, pp. 587-599 (texte)
MORENO Diego, WOODERS John - Dynamic markets for lemons: performance, liquidity, and policy intervention, pp. 601-639 (texte)
GRANT Simon, MENEGHEL Idione, TOURKY Rabee - Savage games, pp. 641-682 (texte)
KOMINERS Scott Duke, SÖNMEZ Tayfun - Matching with slot-specific priorities: theory, pp. 683-710 (texte)
CHATTERJI Shurojit, SEN Arunava, ZENG Huaxia - A characterization of single-peaked preferences via random social choice functions, pp. 711-733 (texte)
ABIZADA Azar - Stability and incentives for college admissions with budget constraints, pp. 735-756 (texte)

ECHENIQUE Federico, PEREYRA Juan Sebastián - Strategic complementarities and unraveling in matching markets, pp. 1-39 (texte)
GOEREE Jacob K., LIEN Yuanchuan - On the impossibility of core-selecting auctions, pp. 41-52 (texte)
CHAN Jimmy H., ZHANG Wenzhang - Approximate efficiency in repeated games with side-payments and correlated signals, pp. 53-87 (texte)
LEVINE David Knudsen, MODICA Salvatore - Dynamics in stochastic evolutionary models, pp. 89-131 (texte)
BURKETT Justin - Optimally constraining a bidder using a simple budget, pp. 133-155 (texte)
WEINSTEIN Jonathan, YILDIZ Muhamet - Reputation without commitment in finitely-repeated games, pp. 157-185 (texte) (supplementary appendix)
ACEMOGLU Daron, CHERNOZHUKOV Victor, YILDIZ Muhamet - Fragility of asymptotic agreement under Bayesian learning, pp. 187-225 (texte)
CHIAPPORI Pierre-André, RENY Philip J. - Matching to share risk, pp. 227-251 (texte)
ULBRICHT Robert - Optimal delegated search with adverse selection and moral hazard, pp. 253-278 (texte)
SANDHOLM William H., STAUDIGL Mathias - Large deviations and stochastic stability in the small noise double limit, pp. 279-355 (texte)
BELHAJ Mohamed, BERVOETS Sebatian, DEROÏAN Frédéric - Efficient networks in games with local complementarities, pp. 357-380 (texte)
VELEZ Rodrigo A. - Fairness and externalities, pp. 381-410 (texte)

Dernière modification le 22.03.2022