Theoretical Economics - Journal of the Econometric Society

Volume 12, n° 3, September 2017

• BARRON Daniel - Attaining efficiency with imperfect public monitoring and one-sided Markov adverse selection, pp. 957-978 (texte)
• HEFTI Andreas - Equilibria in symmetric games: theory and applications, pp. 979-1002 (texte)
• ANDOLFATTO David, NOSAL Ed, SULTANUM Bruno - Preventing bank runs, pp. 1003-1028 (texte)
• BUTURAK Gökhan, EVREN Özgür - Choice overload and asymmetric regret, pp. 1029-1056 (texte)
• HILLER Timo - Friends and enemies: a model of signed network formation, pp. 1057-1087 (texte)
• HELLMAN Ziv, LEVY Yehuda - Bayesian games with a continuum of states, pp. 1089-1120 (texte)
• BLOISE Gaetano, POLEMARCHAKIS Herakles, VAILAKIS Yiannis - Sovereign debt and incentives to default with uninsurable risks, pp. 1121-1154 (texte)
• FUDENBERG Drew, ROMANYUK Gleb, STRACK Philipp - Active learning with a misspecified prior, pp. 1155-1189 (texte)
• DUTTA Bhaskar, VOHRA Rajiv - Rational expectations and farsighted stability, pp. 1191-1227 (texte)
• ALVAREZ-CUADRADO Francisco, LONG Ngo, POSCHKE Markus - Capital-labor substitution, structural change and growth, pp. 1229-1266 (texte)
• MOMI Takeshi - Efficient and strategy-proof allocation mechanisms in economies with many goods, pp. 1267-1306 (texte)
• COOKE Kevin - Preference discovery and experimentation, pp. 1307-1348 (texte)
• LUZ Vitor Farinha - Characterization and uniqueness of equilibrium in competitive insurance, pp. 1349-1391 (texte)
• KOJIMA Fuhito, YAMASHITA Takuro - Double auction with interdependent values: incentives and efficiency, pp. 1393-1438 (texte)

Volume 12, n° 2, May 2017

• CUHADAROGLU Tugce - Choosing on influence, pp. 477-492 (texte)
• CHAMBERS Christopher P., ECHENIQUE Federico, SHMAYA Eran - General revealed preference theory, pp. 493-451 (texte)
• CHO Wonki Jo, JU Biung-Ghi - Multinary group identification, pp. 513-531 (texte)
• KHAN Mohammed Ali, RATH Kali P., YU Haomiao, ZHANG Yongchao - On the equivalence of large individualized and distributionalized games, pp. 533-554 (texte)
• ORTNER Juan - A theory of political gridlock, pp. 555-586 (texte)
• MOULIN Hervé - One dimensional mechanism design, pp. 587-619 (texte)
• DE OLIVEIRA Henrique, DENTI Tommaso, MIHM Maximilian, OZBEK Kemal - Rationally inattentive preferences and hidden information costs, pp. 621-654 (texte)
• IIJIMA Ryota, KAMADA Yuichiro - Social distance and network structures, pp. 655-689 (texte)
• SUGAYA Takuo, WOLITZKY Alexander - Bounding equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with private monitoring, pp. 691-729 (texte)
• LESTER Benjamin, VISSCHERS Ludo, WOLTHOFF Ronald - Competing with asking prices, pp. 731-770 (texte)
• HE Wei, SUN Xiang, SUN Yeneng - Modeling infinitely many agents, pp. 771-815 (texte)
• ORTNER Juan - Durable goods monopoly with stochastic costs, pp. 817-861(texte)
• FRAGIADAKIS Daniel, TROYAN Peter - Improving matching under hard distributional constraints, pp. 863-908 (texte)
• DALEY Brendan, SADOWSKI Philipp - Magical thinking: A representation result, pp. 909-956 (texte)

Volume 12, n° 1, January 2017

• FU Hu, KLEINBERG Robert, LAVI Ron, SMORODINSKY Rann - Job security, stability and production efficiency, pp. 1-24 (texte)
• KIRKEGAARD René - A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems, pp. 25-51 (texte)
• BAISA Brian - Auction design without quasilinear preferences, pp. 53-78 (texte)
• BICH Philippe, LARAKI Rida - On the existence of approximate equilibria and sharing rule solutions in discontinuous games, pp. 79-108 (texte)
• ESÖ Péter, SZENTES Balázs - Dynamic contracting: an irrelevance theorem, pp. 109-139 (texte)
• YE Lixin, ZHANG Chenglin - Monopolistic nonlinear pricing with consumer entry, pp. 141-173 (texte)
• SUZUKI Toru - Directives, expressives, and motivation, pp. 175-210 (texte)
• BARBERÀ Salvador, GERBER Anke - Sequential voting and agenda manipulation, pp. 211-247 (texte)
• MEZZETTI Claudio, RENOU Ludovic - Repeated Nash implementation, pp. 249-285 (texte)
• PYCIA Marek, ÜNVER Utku M. - Incentive compatible allocation and exchange of discrete resources, pp. 287-329 (texte)
• DZIUBINSKI  Marcin Konrad, GOYAL Sanjeev - How do you defend a network? pp. 331-376 (texte)
• DEAN Mark, ALLAIS Pietro Ortoleva-  Ellsberg, and preferences for hedging, pp. 377-424 (texte)
• BONATTI Alessandro, HÖRNER Johannes - Career concerns with exponential learning, pp. 425-475 (texte)