Theoretical Economics - Journal of the Econometric Society

Volume 13, n° 3, September 2018

• GALLO Oihane, INARRA Elena - Rationing rules and stable coalition structures, pp. 933-950 (texte)
• OLSZEWSKI Wojciech, SAFRONOV Mikhail - Efficient chip strategies in repeated games, pp. 951-978 (texte)
• PHELAN Christopher, RUSTICHINI Aldo - Pareto efficiency and identity, pp. 979-1008 (texte)
• EHLERS Lars, WESTKAMP  Alexander - Strategy-proof tie-breaking in matching with priorities, pp. 1009-1042 (texte)
• CHERCHYE Laurens, DERMUYNCK Thomas, DE ROCK Bram - Transitivity of preferences: when does it matter? pp. 1043-1076 (texte)
• ROKETSKIY Nikita - Competition and networks of collaboration, pp. 1077-1110 (texte)
• BARDHI Arjada, GUO Yingni - Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent, pp. 1111-1150 (texte)
• MARTIMORT David, SEMENOV Aggey, STOLE Lars A. - A complete characterization of equilibria in an intrinsic common agency screening game, pp. 1151-1190 (texte)
• OLSZEWSKI Wojciech, SAFRONOV Mikhail - Efficient cooperation by exchanging favors, pp. 1191-1232 (texte)
• DEB Rahul, STEWART Colin - Optimal adaptive testing: informativeness and incentives, pp. 1233-1274 (texte)
• CARROLL Gabriel - On mechanisms eliciting ordinal preferences, pp. 1275-1318 (texte)
• WAKI Yuichiro, DENNIS Richard, FUJIWARA Ippei - The optimal degree of monetary-discretion in a New Keynesian model with private information, pp. 1319-1368 (texte)
• ROCHETEAU Guillaume, WEILL Pierre-Olivier, WONG Russell - A tractable model of monetary exchange with ex-post heterogeneity, pp. 1369-1424 (texte)
• KE Rongzhu, RYAN Christopher Thomas - A general solution method for moral hazard problems, pp. 1425-1481 (texte)

Volume 13, n° 2, May 2018

• BOSMANS Kristof, DECANCQ Koen, OOGHE Erwin - Who's afraid of aggregating money metrics? pp. 467-484 (texte)
• CHAMBERS Christopher P., MILLER Alan D. - Benchmarking, pp. 485-504 (texte)
• ANESI Vincent, DUGGAN John - Existence and indeterminacy of markovian equilibria in dynamic bargaining games, pp. 505-526 (texte)
• KE Shaowei - Rational expectation of mistakes and a measure of error-proneness, pp. 527-552 (texte)
• AZAR Pablo D., MICALI Silvio - Computational principal agent problems, pp. 553-578 (texte)
• NISHIMURA Hiroki - The transitive core: inference of welfare from nontransitive preference relations, pp. 579-606 (texte)
• KOLOTILIN Anton - Optimal information disclosure: a linear programming approach, pp. 607-636 (texte)
• PLANTIN Guillaume, SONG SHIN Hyun - Exchange rates and monetary spillovers, pp. 637-666 (texte)
• CHAVAS Jean-Paul, MENON Martinan, PAGANI Elisa, PERALI Federico - Collective household welfare and intra-household inequality, pp. 667-696 (texte)
• FRANKEL Alex, KARTIK Navin - What kind of central bank competence? pp. 697-728 (texte)
• KIKUCHI Tomoo, NISHIMURA Kazuo, STACHURSKI John - Span of control, transaction costs and the structure of production chains, pp. 729-760 (texte)
• KAMADA Yuichiro, KOJIMA Fuhito - Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: a necessary and sufficient condition, pp. 761-794 (texte)
• LIU Heng - Efficient dynamic mechanisms in environments with interdependent valuations: the role of contingent transfers, pp. 795-830 (texte)
• LE Phuong - Pareto optimal budgeted combinatorial auctions, pp. 831-868 (texte)
• TSOY Anton - Alternating-offer bargaining with the global games information structure, pp. 869-931 (texte)

Volume 13, n° 1, January 2018

• SPRUMONT Yves - Ranking by rating, pp. 1-18 (texte)
• JONSSON Adam, VOORNEVELD Mark - The limit of discounted utilitarianism, pp. 19-38 (texte)
• CARBONELL-NICOLAU Oriol, LLAVADOR Humberto - Inequality reducing properties of progressive income tax schedules: the case of endogenous income, pp. 39-60 (texte)
• AHN David S., ECHENIQUE Federico, SAITO Kota - On path independent stochastic choice, pp. 61-86 (texte)
• LEHRER Ehud, SOLAN Eilon - High frequency repeated games with costly monitoring, pp. 87-114 (texte)
• NIKANDROVA Arina, PANCS Romans - Dynamic project selection, pp. 115-144 (texte)
• STOVALL John E. - Temptation with uncertain normative preference, pp. 145-174 (texte)
• AUSTER Sarah - Robust contracting under common value uncertainty, pp. 175-204 (texte)
• KOTOWSKI Maciej H. - On asymmetric reserve prices, pp. 205-238 (texte)
• CHE Yeon-Koo, TERCIEUX Olivier - Payoff equivalence of efficient mechanisms in large matching markets, pp. 239-272 (texte)
• HERNANDO-VECIANA Angel, MICHELUCCI Fabio - Inefficient rushes in auctions, pp. 273-306 (texte)
• DUTTA Rohan, KNUDSEN LEVINE David Knudsen, MODICA Salvatore - Collusion constrained equilibrium, pp. 307-340 (texte)
• WAGNER Peter A. - Who goes first? Strategic delay under information asymmetry, pp. 341-376 (texte)
• CHADE Hector, EECKHOUT Jan - Matching information, pp. 377-414 (texte)
• HEIFETZ Aviad, KETS Willemien - Robust multiplicity with a grain of naiveté, pp. 415-465 (texte)