Theoretical Economics - Journal of the Econometric Society

Michael Richter and Ariel Rubinstein - "Convex preferences": a new definition, pp. 1169–1183
Florian Brandl and Felix Brandt - Justifying optimal play via consistency, pp. 1185–1201
Margaret Meyer, Inés Moreno de Barreda, and Julia Nafziger - Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk, pp. 1203–1236
Mehmet Ekmekci and M. Bumin Yenmez - Common enrollment in school choice, pp. 1237–1270
Maarten Janssen and Bernhard Kasberger - On the clock of the combinatorial clock auction, pp. 1271–1308
Umut Dur, A. Arda Gitmez, and Özgür Yılmaz - School choice under partial fairness, pp. 1309–1346
William H. Sandholm, Segismundo S. Izquierdo, and Luis R. Izquierdo - Best experienced payoff dynamics and cooperation in the Centipede game, pp. 1347–1386
Joyee Deb and Julio Gonzalez-Diaz - Enforcing social norms: Trust-building and community enforcement, pp. 1387–1434
Marco Battaglini and Rohit Lamba - Optimal dynamic contracting: the first-order approach and beyond, pp. 1435–1482
David Austen-Smith, Wioletta Dziuda, Bård Harstad, and Antoine Loeper - Gridlock and inefficient policy instruments, pp. 1483–1534
John William Hatfield, Scott Duke Kominers, Alexandru Nichifor, Michael Ostrovsky, and Alexander Westkamp, pp. 1535–1590

BLOCH Francis, DUTTA Bhaskar, MANEA Mihai - Efficient partnership formation in networks, pp. 779–811
SZYDLOWSKI Martin - Incentives, project choice, and dynamic multitasking, pp. 813–847
KAMBE Shinsuke - An N-person war of attrition with the possibility of a non-compromising type, pp. 849–886
DUNCAN Alfred J. M., NOLAN Charles - Disputes, debt and equity, pp. 887–925
AUSTER Sarah, GOTTARDI Piero - Competing mechanisms in markets for lemons, pp. 927–970
SILVA Francisco - Renegotiation proof mechanism design with imperfect type verification, pp. 971–1014
AU Pak Hung - The loser's curse in the search for advice, pp. 1015–1061
LOERTSCHER Simon, WASSER Cédric - Optimal structure and dissolution of partnerships, pp. 1063–1114
YAMAMOTO Yuichi - Stochastic games with hidden states, pp. 1115–1167

KOESSLER Frederic, SKRETA Vasiliki - Selling with evidence, pp. 345–371
EGUIA Jon X., NICOLO Antonio - Information and targeted spending, pp.373–402
MONZÓN Ignacio - Observational learning in large anonymous games, pp. 403–435
MASSARI Filippo - Market selection in large economies: a matter of luck, pp. 437–473
PÉREZ-NIEVAS Mikel, CONDE-RUIZ José I., GIMÉNEZ Eduardo L. - Efficiency and endogenous fertility, pp. 475–512
AWAYA Yu, KRISHNA Vijay - Communication and cooperation in repeated games, pp. 513–553
GERSHKOV Alex, MOLDOVANU Benny, SHI Xianwen - Voting on multiple issues: what to put on the ballot?, pp. 555–596
DORASZELSKI Ulrich, ESCOBAR Juan F. - Protocol invariance and the timing of decisions in dynamic games, pp. 597–646
CRIPPS Martin W., THOMAS Caroline D. - Strategic experimentation in queues, pp. 647–708
MACKENZIE Andrew - A foundation for probabilistic beliefs with or without atoms, pp. 709–778

FARO José Heleno, LEFORT Jean-Philippe - Dynamic objective and subjective rationality, pp. 1–14 (texte)
TIERNEY Ryan - On the manipulability of efficient exchange rules, pp. 15–38 (texte)
NODA Shunya - Full surplus extraction and within-period ex post implementation in dynamic environments, pp. 39–69 (texte) (supplementary appendix)
SOBEL Joel - Iterated weak dominance and interval-dominance supermodular games, pp. 71–102 (texte)
KE Shaowei - Boundedly rational backward induction, pp. 103–134 (texte)
BLOCK Juan I., FUDENBERG Drew, LEVINE David K. - Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory, pp. 135–172 (texte) (supplementary appendix)
GALPERTI Simone - A theory of personal budgeting, pp. 173–210 (texte)
ELLIOTT Matthew L., NAVA Francesco - Decentralized bargaining in matching markets: efficient stationary equilibria and the core, pp. 211–251 (texte) (supplementary appendix)
FOERSTER Manuel - Dynamics of strategic information transmission in social networks, pp. 253–295 (texte)
ATTAR Andrea, MARIOTTI Thomas, SALANIÉ François - On competitive nonlinear pricing, pp. 297–343 (texte) (supplementary appendix)

Dernière modification le 22.03.2022